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Powell: A Review of the Judicial Exceptions to the Kirby Lumber Rule

A REVIEW OF JUDICIAL EXCEPTIONS
TO THE KIRBY LUMBER RULE
INTRODUCTION

The liberal use of derogatory superlatives by commentators discussing
cancellation of indebtedness income imparts a clear impression of the state of
the tax law in that area. They remark, for example, that "[e]ven the most rabid
dialectition of federal tax law would readily concede that logic has taken an
extended vacation in the debt cancellation area," 1 that the development of
the law of debt cancellation is "highly inadequate, ' ' 2 and that it is one of the
"murkiest pools of obscurity in the tax law."3
Numerous reasons exist for this difficulty. A fundamental problem is that
"income" has not been adequately defined either in an economic sense 4 or in
the federal tax usage.5 The statutory definition provides that "gross income
means all income from whatever source derived, including . . . [i]ncome from
I. Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax: A Problem of
Creeping Confusion, 14 TAX L. REv. 225, 286 (1959).
2. Surrey & Warren, The Income Tax Project of the American Law Institute: Gross Income, Deductions, Accounting, Gains and Losses, Cancellation of Indebtedness, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 761, 815 (1953).
3. Eustice, supra note I, at 225.
4. Economists have variously defined income as a "service-flow in consumption," as "recurrent receipts," as the "net addition to an individual's economic power with a specified
period of time," 0. BROWNLEE & E. ALLEN, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 243 (2d ed. 1954),
or as the "algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and
(2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end
of the period in question." H. SIVIANS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
The service-flow concept includes goods and services consumed in money value and in
the estimated money value of unpaid labor. This would appear to include money borrowed
when it was consumed and would not include discharge of a debt which had previously been
consumed. The recurrent receipts definition would not include debt discharge presumably
for the likelihood of its non-recurrence. The net accretion concept comes close to the increment in assets theory used by courts in this area but its failings lie in the absence of a
given time period for computation and in the lack of specificity for determining net assets,
i.e.: Is one's self an asset that increases in value when it becomes trained or educated? The
algebraic sum theory would apparently combine consumption and net accretion in assets,
thus retaining the problems with respect to debt cancellation mentioned above. Economists
leave the field insisting income is gain, whether viewed as the personal ability to spend
in a period of time, or the net accumulation of capital or consumable assets; the difficulty
remains-what do we count when we compute gain? These definitions of course look to
what should, in the opinion of each advocate, constitute income, but, such considerations
are relevant when the proposed legislation in this area is evaluated. See 0. BROWNLEE & E.
ALLEN, supra at 242-47; H. SIMONS, supra at 50-51.
5. "There remains the larger question whether the statutory exclusions and specialized
treatment of certain items plus the judicial and administrative rules developed for certain
particular categories of receipts permit the formulation of a definition of 'income.' . . . Is
it perhaps necessary to a sound income tax that the content of 'income' should remain
essentially fluid, so that the application of the tax can keep pace with changing conditions?"
S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL, & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 115 (1972).
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discharge of indebtedness."' This "definition" incorporates the development of
judicial theories under which the existence of discharge of indebtedness income has been determined. Unfortunately the confusion that accompanied
development of these theories has not diminished.
According to the tax court, the increment in assets theory, predicating tax
liability on an accession to income or a freeing of assets, has required support
by a deductions approach to taxability.7 The courts generally reach the conclusion that gain or profit is essential to the existence of income, so that the
standard is vague, requiring only "something of value.""
The problem can be attacked from the rear, however, and, although this
has not necessarily proved a better approach, the courts have created a large
body of law defining what is not income from the discharge of indebtedness.
The several exceptions to the rule of taxability treated by this paper fill the
void left by the'absence of a comprehensive legislative solution to the problem
of cancellation of indebtedness income. Congress, in adopting the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code, did not take that opportunity to improve upon the courts' lawmaking9 despite the availability of a carefully drafted proposal by the American
Law InstituteO and a somewhat similar provision proposed by the House of
Representatives.11
GENERAL RULE

A general rule of taxability of discharge of indebtedness was laid down
in United States,v. Kirby Lumber Co.' 2 Although subsequent cases have whittled
6. I.R.C. §61(a)(12).
7. Compare Putoma Corp., 66 T.C. 652 n.20 (1976) with Eustice, supra note 1, at 252-53.
Eustice asserts that the increment in assets theory is applied if the loan transaction is a
"long-term non-recurring capital financing operation" and that the deductions approach is
appropriate if the liability'fs itself an ordinary, currently deductible expense item, the recovery of which creates a tax and economic benefit requiring inclusion. The propriety of the
deductions approach, as a matter of policy is unsettled. While the House draft specifically
adopted it, the ALI draft did not. See text accompanying notes 15, 50-58, 67-81, 88, 110 &
180 infra.

8. See text accompanying note 66 infra. See note 218 infra.
9. Section 86, "Discharge of Indebtedness," H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. §76 (1954),
(H.R. 8300 became the Internal Revenue Code of 1954) was struck by the Senate Finance
Committee without adequate explanation- and never enacted into law. 100 CONG. REc. 9001
(1954) (amendment No. 18 to H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. §76 (1954) striking out "discharge of indebtedness"). No one appeared personally to support §76 before the House Ways
and Means.Committee. Hearings on H.R. 8300 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
83d- Cong.,..lst Sess., pt. 2, at 1251-56 (1953). The section was struck because "testimony
before its [Senate Finance Committee] hearings revealed that the House draft was the cause
of considerable doubt as to its meaning and effects." SENATE COMM. ON FiNANcE, REPORT TO
AcCOMPANY H.R. 8300, S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1954). Hearings on HR.
8300 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 12-13, 343, 483

(1954).
10. . See App.-A infra....... .
11., See App, B.infra.12. 284 US.. 1, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. 814. (1931), This was not the first time taxation of
.ancellation indebtedness income had. b.een :suggested.. See Eustice, supra note 1, at 228-29.
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away at that rule, 1 3 it is, in limited form, firmly entrenched in the tax law. In
Kirby Lumber, the taxpayer-corporation purchased its own bonds at a discount
in the open market. The court found taxable income from the transaction in
the amount of the difference between the issue price of the bonds and the lower
price at the time of their subsequent acquisition by the corporation. In the
opinion, Justice Holmes stated:
Here there was no shrinkage of assets and the taxpayer made a clear
gain. As a result of its dealings it made available $137,521.30 assets previously offset by the obligation of bonds now extinct. We see nothing to
be gained by the discussion of judicial definitions. The defendant in error
has realized within the year an accession to income, if we take
words in
14
their plain popular meaning, as they should be taken here.
The "no shrinkage of assets" language in Kirby Lumber and the freeing of
assets notion as stated above have been used most often by courts attempting
to reach a tax definition of income broad enough to encompass cancellation
of indebtedness.

15

G=r
A principal exception to income realization by a debtor on cancellation of
a debt arises in the case of a gift.' 6 A gratuitous forgiveness motivated by
donative intent will not create income to the debtor. In Helvering v. American
Dental Co.,' 7 the gift exclusion for debt cancellation income was extended by

the United States Supreme Court to a corporate debtor whose creditors cancelled its obligation for interest and back rents, even though deductions for
the items had been accrued in prior years. There the Court explicitly denied
any requirement of donative intent, stating, "The fact that the motives leading
to the cancellations were those of business or even selfish, if it be true, is not
significant.""' The standard set out by the Court apparently requires only "the
receipt of financial advantages gratuitously,"'19 "a release of something for
nothing."
13.

20

Compare text accompanying notes 181-183 infra with text accompanying notes 205-206

inIra.
14. 284 U.S. at 3, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. 814, at 2952.
15.

See Eustice, supra note 1.

16. I.R.C. § 102(a). Similarly, a cancellation effected by a bequest in the will of a decedentcreditor does not create taxable income to the debtor. Other articles treating this topic
area are Donald, Chirelstein & Suwalsky, Jr., Cancellation of Indebtedness, TAX MNGM'T
(BNA) §88-3d (1976) [hereinafter cited as Donald]; Blattner, Debt Cancellation, N.Y.U. 30TH
INST. ON FED. TAX. 237, 249-51 (1972); Eustice, supra note 1,at 248-50; Sanders, Debt Cancella-

tion - Without Realization of Income, U.S.

CAL. TAX. INST.

tion of Debt Collection and Cancellation, 48 CALIF. L.
17. 318 U.S. 322, 1943-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9318 (1943).

REV.

565, 573-74 (1959); Wilson, Taxa623, 637-38 (1960).

18. Id. at 331, U.S. Tax Cas. 9318, at 9449.
19. Id. at 330, U.S. Tax Cas. 9318, at 9448.
20. Id. at 331, U.S. Tax Cas. 9318, at 9449. Two justices joined in a dissent that
supported the finding of the Board of Tax Appeals, stating that "wise fiscal as well as
judicial administration" mandated that the lower court's opinion be upheld. "It [B.T.A.]

knew well enough the difference between taxable income and gifts." Id. (Frankfurter &
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The courts in subsequent cases attempted to follow the "something for
nothing" rule of American Dental Co. 21 until the Supreme Court circumscribed
that rule in Commissioner v. Jacobson. 2 In Jacobson, a debtor repurchased
leasehold estates at less than their original issue face amount. While not expressly overruling American Dental Co., the Court found taxable income equal
to the difference between the face amount and the repurchase price. No gift
was inferred because each bondholder sought to minimize his probable loss
and "there was nothing to indicate that the seller was not getting all that he
could for all that he had."2s The Court distinguished the American Dental Co.
case by labelling this transaction a divisible one in which part of the claim
'24
was released for cash and the other part "for nothing.
Jacobson injected a significant principle which had been expressly disregarded in American Dental Co. The Jacobson Court state:
Jackson, JJ., dissenting). The dissent supported equal treatment of gifts, whether cash or
forgiveness of indebtedness.
21. See, e.g., Edmont Hotel, 10 T.C. 260 (1948) (officer acting for closely connected
principals acquired bonds for less than par by direct negotiation, not on the open market:
a gratuitous forgiveness, no taxable income); National Ice & Cold Storage Co., 6 T.C.M.
(CCH) 80 (1947) (Citing Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 1942-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9318 (1947)); Shellabarger Grain Products Co., 2 T.C. 75 (1943) (despite a concurrent sale between creditor-estate and debtor, no taxable income resulted because creditor
did not receive any other benefit from transaction); Liberty Mirror Works, 3 T.C. 1018
(1944) (the totality of the circumstances, including debtor's financial straits and previous
cancellations by same creditor without consideration, indicated a gratuitous cancellation
not giving rise to taxable income under the American Dental Co. rule); Manhattan Soap
Co., 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 257 (1944) (the principle of American Dental Co. applied to a
compromise between petitioner and the government which reduced federal excise tax
liability of the company; even if the government cannot make a gift, "it does not follow
that the settlement made pursuant to statutory authority was not in the nature of a gift
and was not 'akin to a reduction' of the tax imposed." Id. at 263); Pancoast Hotel Co., 2 T.C.
362 (1943) (since no consideration passed to bondholders for their agreement to accept less
than the debt due, the agreement was a gratuitous forgiveness and did not constitute
taxable income); Shellabarger Grain Products Co., 2 T.C. 75 (1943), aff'd in part and modified, 147 F.2d 177, 185, 44-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9527, 11,147 (7th Cir. 1944) ("We do not
think any useful purpose could be served in analyzing [Kirby Lumber and American Dental
Co.]." Assuming a forgiveness of respondent's debt to bank, the forgiveness represented a
release of something for nothing.); F. W. Graham, 1 T.C.M. (CCH) 834 (1943) (partial
forgiveness of a debt held gratuitous since the creditor received no consideration and the
debtor received a benefit); Elizabeth Operating Corp., 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 817 (1943) (mere
fact that a debt had been cancelled does not imply that the cancellation was gratuitous;
petitioner must establish by competent evidence that no consideration passed to the
mortgagee); F.W. Leadbetter, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 626 (1943) (transaction held not a voluntary
forgiveness of debt since petitioner was merely manipulating his own personal holding
company and thus the parties were not acting at arm's length); Midland Tailors, 2 T.C.M.
(CCH) 281 (1943) (forgiveness of debt for accrued and unpaid shareholder-officers' salaries
held a gift, although the regulations may give ground for calling the forgiveness a contribution to capital). See also Pondfield Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 1943-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9600
(2d Cir. 1943), rev'g and remanding I T.C. 217; McConway ScTorley Corp., 2 T.C. 593 (1943) ;
George Hall Corp., 1 T.C. 471, reconsidered, 2 T.C. 146 (1943); Brown Cab Co., I T.C.M.
(CCH) 450 (1943).
22. 336 U.S. 28, 1949-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9133 (1948).
23. Id. at 50, 1949-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9133, at 93.
24. Id. at 51, 1949-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9133, at 94.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol30/iss1/3

4

Powell: A Review of the Judicial Exceptions to the Kirby Lumber Rule
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXX

It is quite possible that a bondholder might make a gift of an entire
bond to anyone, including the maker of it. The facts and findings in
this case do not establish any such intent of the seller to make a gift in
contradiction of the 2 5natural implications arising from the sales and
assignments he made.

The rationale of Jacobson requires a factual context which demonstrates both
donative intent and the absence of consideration passing from debtor to
creditor for the release if rio income is to be realized.26 A family relationship
in which the forgiveness of indebtedness is bestowed out of natural affection
helps to resolve the issue of intent in favor of a debtor.2 7 In a business or commercial setting, the intent to make a gift is more difficult to prove.28 Consequently, cases postdating Jacobsonwhich hold a discharge of indebtedness to be
a gift in this setting are infrequent.2 9 In Commissioner v. Duberstein,3° the
25. Id. (emphasis added). See text accompanying note 18 supra. Jacobson also contains
language reaffirming the Kirby Lumber Co. increment in assets theory: "His [debtor's] acquisition, and consequent control over the discharge of these bonds, therefore, improved his
net worth by the difference between their face amount and the price he paid for them."
Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. at 38, 1949-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 19133, at 88.
26. Denman Tire & Rubber Co., 14 T.C. 706 (1950), aff'd, 192 F.2d 261, 1951-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 19496 (6th Cir. 1951). After a compromise payment of certain excise taxes, petitioner
argued that the unpaid balance of the taxes was a gift to it from the United States Government, but the Tax Court found the settlement figure reached after prolonged negotiations
to be neither an express nor an implied gift; rather, it was "the best settlement it [government] could get from a corporation in an unsound financial condition." Id. at 714. On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court on the excise tax settlement and on
its finding that a bondholder's acceptance of approximately half the debt due was also a
taxable cancellation. See also 1180 E. 63d St. Bldg. Corp., 12 T.C. 437 (1949) (property tax
liability extinguished pursuant to various court proceedings held not a voluntary and
gratuitous gift cancellation). See note 29 infra. Contra, Manhattan Soap Co., 3 T.G.M. (CCH),
257 (1944) (decided before Jacobson).
27. Compare text accompanying notes 53-37 infra with text accompanying notes 45-47
infra.
28. The burden of proving the creditor's intent to make a gift is on the taxpayer. Commercial Freight Lines, Inc., 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 210, 212 (1957).
29. Cases finding no gift in a commercial debt cancellation include: Capitol Coal Corp.
v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 361, ]958-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19121 (2d Cir. 1957) (since the debt
cancellation arose out of business sales transaction, the creditors were acting to protect their
best business interests by obtaining the best possible deal and by helping debtor stay in business as a potential customer; no gift should be inferred from friendship between sellers and
purchasers who had dealt together for years), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936 (1957); Bradford v.
Commissioner, 233 F.2d 935, 1956-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19552 (6th Cir. 1956) (bank's purchase of
petitioner's obligation for less than face value held not a gift; bank president found to, be
motivated by desire for best price available and for continued business with the petitioner
notwithstanding his testimony that a gift had been intended); Canton v. United States, 226
F.2d 313, 1955-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19705 (8th Cir. 1955), (criminal fraud case in which defendant
received cancellation of indebtedness income from his brother according to jury; evidence
was presented to support that loan was cancelled for procurement of goods; defendant admitted to agents that cancellation was income and should have been reported, held not a
gift), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 965 (1956). Several courts have held a cancellation to be a gift in
a commercial setting. See, e.g., Florentina v. United States, 226 F.2d 619, 1955-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 19713 (3d Cir. 1955). forgiveness by sole creditor of indebtedness owed by recently bankrupt debtor held not a gift; legally sufficient consideration for the forgiveness existed under
all the integrated circumstances of the transactions between debtor and creditor to preclude
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Supreme Court expressed a willingness to accept the decisions of the triers of
fact with respect to the intent to make a gift. Donative intent is represented as a
matter of law by a "detached and disinterested generosity," made "out of
affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses," with the primary inquiry to be made into the intention of the alleged donor.31 The cases and
classification as gift), rev'g and remanding, 124 F. Supp. 138 (D.N.J. 1954); New York Credit
Men's Adjustment Bureau v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 214, 1953-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9161
(S.D.N.Y. 1953) (the terms of the agreement constituted "a cold business deal," "a purely
commercial barter" showing no evidence of gratuitous cancellation, id. at 219, 1953-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9161, at 47, 287). The New York Credit court, apparently misreading the impact of
Jacobson, stated: "the motive prompting the surrender of this obligation of Stor-Aid is immaterial.... While I recognize that the fact that 'the motives leading to the cancellations
were those of business' is not significant, . . . the entire transaction gives no evidence of the
'receipt of financial advantages gratuitously,' . . . given by Sears to Stor-Aid. The factual
situation here presented is in no manner analogous to that in [American Dental]....

And,

if the intention of the parties is to be given any weight, it is undisputed that there was no
intention whatsoever on the part of Sears to make a gift to Stor-Aid." Id. at 219, 1953-1
U.S. Tax Gas. 9161, at 47,286-87. (Citations omitted) (quoting Helvering v. American Dental
Co., 318 U.S. at 331, 1943-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9318, at 9449)). In Marshall Drug Co. v. United
States, 95 F. Supp. 820 (Ct. Cl. 1951), pursuant to a plan to reorganize petitioner-corporation,
some creditors were persuaded by new management to cancel part of their claims. The
court found this to be exercise of business judgment, not intended as gift: "Gifts as a rule
are on a personal basis. Plaintiff's creditors were in business." Id. at 821. See also David
H. Kelley, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 263 (1960) (cancellation of indebtedness not gratuitous but
part of price creditor-employer had to pay "to settle its differences with petitioner or to be
relieved of its obligations to employ petitioner," id. at 268); Commercial Freight Lines, Inc.,
16 T.C.H. (CCH) 210 (1957) (cancellation of accrued interest found to represent no intent,
express or implied, to give something for nothing; 20 letters between parties indicated only
that the creditor sought the best possible settlement from insolvent debtor); Jacob M. Kaplan,
21 T.C. 134 (1953) (petitioner received taxable income in the form of a dividend from the
cancellation of an indebtedness by his wholly-owned corporation); Standard Brass & Mfg.
Co., 20 T.C. 371 (1953) (royalty indebtedness reduced pursuant to a contract provision providing for renegotiation held to be a "strictly business transaction containing none of the
characteristics of a gift," id. at 376); Spear Box Co., 13 T.C. 238 (1949) (forgiveness of a
part of an indebtedness owed to one company by another without intent to make a gift,
despite personal and business relationship among officers, because "an even trade" benefitting
both companies was effected). Contra, Reynolds v. Boos, 188 F.2d 322, 1951-1 U.S. Tax Gas.
9205 (8th Cir. 1954) (creditor's forgiveness of back rents due, as 'water over the dam' held
a release of 'something for nothing' and a gift, regardless of subsequent agreement entered
into for possible tax advantages). Id. at 323, 1951-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9205, at 16,397. The
Reynolds court did not mention Jacobson, stating that, "[w]e are aware of no departure by
the Supreme Court from that position [American Dental Co.] in a gift situation." Id. at 326,
1951-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9205, at 16,399; Astoria Marine Constr. Co., 12 T.C. 798 (1949) (settlement of notes in the amount of $26,000 for a $500 cash payment to creditor who, after investigation, believed he was getting the best price he could, held not a gift under Jacobson;
contra, Shellabarger Grain Products Co., 2 T.C. 75 (1943) (decided before Jacobson)); 1180
E. 63d St. Bldg. Corp., 12 T.C. 439 (1949); Smythe Bldg. Co., 12 T.C. 320 (1949) (bondholders
intended to obtain the highest price available for claims; held no gift under Jacobson);
contra, Pancoast Hotel Co., 2 T.C. 362 (1943) (decided' before Jacobson); Liberty Mirror
Works, 3 T.C. 1018 (1944) (decided before Jacobson).
30. 363 U.S. 278, 1960-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9515 (1960). "Life in all its fullness must
supply the answer to the riddle." Id. at 288 n.9, 1960-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9515, at 77,243
(quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933) (Cardozo, J.)).
31. Id. at 285, 1960-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9515, at 77,242 (quoting Commissioner v. Lobue,
351 US. 243 (1956)). By "intention" the Court meant to define the proper criterion as one
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rulings attempting to distinguish between gifts and taxable cancellations of
32
indebtedness, however, are not markedly clearer after Duberstein.
Courts continue to examine cancellation of indebtedness gifts in light of
American Dental Co. and Jacobson perhaps because the motivations or intentions between creditors and financially pressed debtors are unlikely to be
identical to those between donors and donees in happier financial circumstances.
While it might seem the "height of absurdity" 33 to argue that the United States
Government intends a gift when it settles a tax liability, a debt cancellation
could occur between family members who transact business. Judicial comments
on the unlikelihood a4 of a gift from a creditor to a debtor should not dampen
arguments when donative intent was indeed the dominant reason for a
transfer. 35 The issue remains a factual one. 36 In an attempt to avoid the results
of prior holdings finding gifts in business settings, 3 7 the American Law Institute
draft would have codified the gift exception to debt cancellation income and
would have limited its application to personal, non-commercial transactions.
The infrequency with which courts have found gifts in commercial settings
after Jacobson and Duberstein appears to minimize the current need for such
a limitation. The House draft provided simply that "gift" would be one of
six exceptions to the general rule of taxability. 38 Both drafts would have largely
that reaches the "basic . . . dominant reason" in fact for the donor's transfer. Id. at 286,
1960-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19515, at '37,242.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238, 1962-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 19700 (10th Cir.
1962) (unenforceable gambling debt cancelled after transfer of appreciated property has
no effect on the amount of tax); Harry L. Bialock, 35 T.C. 649 (1961) (no evidence of any
intent by creditor to make a gift present in the record or in petitioner's testimony, but
circumstances indicated creditor was trying to make the best deal possible); Philomena C.
Dosek, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 688 (1971) (no gift found when cancellation of approximately
$12,000 indebtedness was supported by valuable consideration in money or money's worth
for the transfer of the property in question and there was no evidence of donative intent);
Gustave J. Bosse, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1772 (1970) (since decedent made an inter vivos gift
cancelling the indebtedness, no valid indebtedness existed after his death and thus the
supposed forgiveness of the debt by the estate did not create taxable income, but if an indebtedness had existed, the forgiveness by the estate would not have been a gift under
Duberstein). See also Cooper v. United States, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9591 (S.D. Ala. 1975).
33. Eustice, supra note 1, at 249. See also Denman Tire & Rubber Co., 14 T.C. 706 (1950),
aff'd, 192 F.2d 261, 1951-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19496 (6th Cir. 1951); 1180 E. 63d St. Bldg. Corp.,
12 T.C. 439 (1949); Manhattan Soap Co., 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 257 (1944).
34. See, e.g., Capitol Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 361, 1958-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
19121 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936: "Furthermore a gift, even if the representatives of the creditors had the power so to dispose of corporate assets, would be a most
unusual occurrence when 'made by a company engaged in operating a business for profit.'
Id. at 363, U.S. Tax Cas. 19121, at 67,164.
35. See Capitol Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 361, 1958-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19121
(2d Cir.) (friendship after years of business dealings disregarded), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936
(1958); Canton v. United States, 226 F.2d 313, 1955-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19705 (8th Cir. 1955) (no
gift from brother), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 965 (1956); Spear Box Co. v. Commissioner, 182
F.2d 844, 1950-1 U.S. Tax Cas. -9339 (2d Cir. 1950) (personal relationship disregarded).
36. Commissioner v. Duberslein, 36 U.S. 278, 1960-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19515 (1960).
37. See App. A, §XllS(e)(3) infra; 1 ALI FED. INCOME TAX STAT. §Xl15(e)(3), at 217 (Feb.
1954 Draft); Eustice, supra note 1, at 271.
38. See App. B, §76(a)(2) infra.
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repeated the judicial rules, but in the case of the ALI draft, the American
Dental Co. digression would have been eliminated. It is doubtful that either
draft on this issue would simplify the law, but a correct statement of the law
in the statutes might create more order.
CONTRIBUTION TO CAPITAL BY SHARIEHOLDER-CREDITOR

A long-standing exception 9 to the Kirby Lumber rule, the nontaxable contribution to capital4 0 may apply when an obligation owed a shareholder41
creditor by a corporation debtor is forgiven.
The Regulations apply the contribution to capital exception "to the extent
of the principal of the debt." 42 This application of the rule is not difficult.
39. See United States v. Oregon-Washington R.R. & Nay. Co., 251 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1918);
A.M. Lawrence, 13 B.T.A. 463 (1928).
40. See generally Donald, supra note 16, §88-3d at A-4 & A-5; Blattner, supra note 16,
at 247-49; Eustice, supra note 1, at 250-51; Sanders, supra note 16, at 574-75; Wilson, supra
note 16, at 644-46.
41. I.R.C. §118. For cases applying the contribution to capital exception see, e.g., Commissioner v. Fender Sales, Inc., 338 F.2d 924, 1965-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9104 (9th Cir. 1964)
(salary obligations discharged by payment in stock held contributions to capital for purposes
of corporation's tax liability), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 813 (1965); Chenango Textile Corp. v.
Commissioner, 148 F.2d 296, 1945-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9241 (2d Cir. 1945) (shareholder's agreement to take less for note given by corporation as price of securities held a contribution to
capital); Carroll-McCreary Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 303, 1942-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9183
(2d Cir. 1941) (officers-shareholders' forgiveness of a debt for unpaid salaries held to be a
contribution to capital; because no consideration was paid, other than advantages flowing
from furthering life of corporation, release deemed gratuitous within the meaning of the
Treasury regulation); Commissioner v. Auto Strop Safety Razor Co., 74 F.2d 226, 1935-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 9017 (2d Cir. 1934) (the cancellation of debt by the sole shareholder of both
the debtor and creditor corporations following dissolution of the creditor corporation held
a contribution to capital of the debtor corporation, notwithstanding that the debtor was
on the accrual method and the creditor on the cash method); United States v. OregonWashington R.R. & Nay. Co., 251 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1918); Oppenheim's Inc. v. Kavanagh, 90
F. Supp. 107, 1950-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9249 (E.D. Mich. 1950) (debt forgiveness by new shareholder held a contribution to capital); George Hall Corp. v. Shaughnessy, 67 F. Supp. 748,
1946-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5904 (N.D. N.Y. 1946) (corporate president's.forgiveness of interest
on corporate bonds held a contribution to capital). In the matter of Triple Z Products, Inc.,
1940-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9705 (S.D. N.Y. 1940) (salary forgiveness from officers-shareholders held
a contribution to capital because officers received no consideration for the release); Hartland
Assoc., 54 T.C. 1580 (1970) (cancellation of interest indebtedness by shareholder-creditor
held a capital contribution, not withstanding deduction thereof in prior years); Utilities &
Indus. Corp., 41 T.C. 888 (1964) (cancellation of debt on a note plus interest held a contribution to capital); Sheraton Plaza Co., 39 T.C. 697 (1963) (cancellation of debt by
petitioner's sole shareholder considered a contribution to capital or an adjustment of purchase
price); A.M. Lawrence, 13 B.T.A. 463 (1928); S.H. DeRoy & Co., 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 451 (1944)
(forgiveness by transfer of bonds, accrued interest thereon and an account receivable from
stockholder-creditors held not to result in taxable income but rather a contribution to
capital).
42. Treas. Reg. §1.61-12(a), T.D. 6984, 33 Fed. Reg. 19,174 (1968). The principal versus
non-principal distinction was applied by Learned Hand in United States v. OregonWashington R.R. & Nay. Co., 251 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1918): "mhe cancellation of the debt
was a means of contribution to its capital account, quite as though the money had been
contributed by the stockholder only to enhance the value of his stock. The financial relief,
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The cancellation should be gratuitous, 43 that is, made without consideration, 4 4
so given, will, it is true, be eventually reflected in the income, since the defendant will no
longer be entitled under the act to deduct the interest on the debt; but that only brings
out more clearly its character as a capital contribution. We regard the difference as precisely
equivalent to the difference between the cancellation of a portion of the mortgage bonds
and a cancellation of an equal portion of their coupons. Common useage would, if we are
right, unfailingly allocate the first as an increase in capital assets and the second as an
increase in income." Id. at 213. See also Utilities & Indus. Corp., 41 T.C. 888 (1964); Buckeye
Cereal Co., 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 426 (1943).
43. The Supreme Court was responsible for a share of confusion in the capital contribution and gift exceptions to Kirby Lumber by its approval of the former in Helvering
v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 1943-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9318 (1942): "Where a stockholder gratuitously forgives the corporation's debt to himself, the transaction has long been
recognized by the Treasury as a contribution to the capital of the corporation." Id. at 328,
1943-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19318, at 9448. After American Dental Co., the Tax Court decided
George Hall Corp., 2 T.C. 146 (1943), in which it held that the cancellation of overdue
debenture interest by a shareholder-creditor was a gift: "We can see no escape from applying
the same rationale to this case as was applied by the Supreme Court in the Dental case, requiring the conclusion that the voluntary cancellation of debenture interest by the debenture holder - a large shareholder - was a gift which was not taxable income to the
petitioner corporation .... " Id. at 146. The court went on to note that: "The fact that
the regulations may give ground for calling it also a contribution to capital . . . does not
affect this decision." Id. at 147 (citations omitted). Subsequently in George Hall Corp. v.
Shaughnessy, 67 F. Supp. 748, 1946-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5904 (N.D. N.Y. 1946), the federal
district court apparently found no problem with calling the forgiveness both a gift and a
contribution to capital: "It is apparent that litigation arose out of the taxing status of the
item of $107,730, and it was determined that same was a gift ....
"The conclusion is reached that Angsbury's action in forgiving the corporate debt due
him constituted a contribution to the capital of the corporation .... " Id. at 749, 1946-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. 5904, at 12,622 (citations omitted). The Tax Court followed the precedent it
set in the first George Hall Corp. case, Midland Tailors, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 281 (1943) holding that forgiveness of accrued salaries by officers-stockholders was a gift.
The Tax Court then held, in McConway & Torley Corp., 2 T.C. 593 (1943) that both
principal and interest forgiven by a shareholder-creditor were gratuitous within the American
Dental Co. rule and that the contribution to capital regulation therefore need not be considered. The court stated: "The situation here at hand is in essence not different from that
in George Hall Corporation . . . and Pancoast Hotel Co. . . . wherein we applied the
principle enunciated in the American Dental Co. case." Id. at 595 (citations omitted). Pancoast Hotel Co., 2 T.C. 362 (194S), however, did not involve a shareholder-creditor. In S.H.
DeRoy & Co., 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 451 (1944), which dealt with forgiveness of bond principal
and interest and an account receivable for rent, Pancoast Hotel Co. and George Hall Corp.
were cited as support for a conclusion of no taxable income, but the Court noted that: "The
forgiving creditors owned substantially all of its capital stock. They had a valid business
reason for cancelling the debts, namely, to relieve petitioner of its burdensome indebtedness
and to put it on a sound financial footing. In this respect the facts are similar to those in
George Hall Corporation .... The parties to the transaction here all treated it as a contribution to petitioner's capital and such we think it was." Id. at 452 (citations omitted). Query
if a "valid business reason" is "gratuitous?" The court seems to be stating that the controlling
factor is the parties' intent as evidenced by their treatment of the cancellations as capital
contributions. Motives, however, were disregarded in American Dental Co. which did not
involve a capital contribution. See also Chenango Textile Corp. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d
296, 1945-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9241 (2d Cir. 1945); Pondfield Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 1943-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 9600 (2d Cir. 1943); Commercial Freight Lines, Inc., 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 210
(1957) (holding no gift by stockholder-creditor without mentioning contribution to capital). In
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and should be made by the shareholder-creditor in his shareholder capacity
46
with the intent to make a capital contribution. Because in the cases to date
the stockholder-creditors have forgiven debts only to close corporations, the
intent to contribute to capital has been readily implied by the courts. If, however, a corporation's stocks and bonds are widely traded, a shareholder, who
also happened to be a bondholder in that concern, would have to find other
evidence of his intent.4 7
The contribution to capital exception nevertheless has given rise to some
complex and confusing litigation by virtue of a longstanding loophole in the
tax law. The problem is complex because the Commissioner has strained to
reluctant to
argue somewhat unrelated theories which the courts have 4been
8
dam.
statutory
leaky
a
up
patching
of
adopt for the purpose
The problem arises when there is an accrual method taxpayer-corporation
and a cash method shareholder-creditor. When non-principal items such as
salary or interest are accrued and deducted by the corporation, and the shareholder in a later taxable year forgives the indebtedness in favor of the corporation without ever having recognized the income, dearly a distortion has
occurred.49 The Commissioner for many years has litigated when this situation
arises; and to date he has argued both the tax benefit theory5" (that upon recovery of the deducted item, the corporation should have to repay to the

Sheraton Plaza Co., 39 T.C. 697 (1963), the Tax Court reiterated the lack of necessity for
distinguishing the facts with respect to the several exceptions to the rule of taxability.
Compare Sheraton Plaza with Putoma Corp., 66 T.C. 652 (1976): "A contribution to capital
is hardly a gift. When a shareholder makes a contribution to capital by cancelling a debt,
he simply converts a debt obligation to an equity interest, expecting a yield on his investment and a higher price for disposition of his stock." Id. at 652 n.17.
44. See Treas. Reg. §1.61-12(a), T.D. 6984, 33 Fed. Reg. 19,174 (1968).
45. Pacific Magnesium, Inc. v. Westover, 86 F. Supp. 644, 1949-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19430
(S.D. Cal. 1949), aff'd per curiam, 183 F.2d 584, 1950-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9403 (9th Cir. 1950);
Liberty Mirror Works, 3 T.C. 1018 (1944) ("We do not think that the gratuitous forgiveness
of a corporation's debt by nonstockholder-creditors necessarily results in a contribution to
capital .... " Id. at 1024). See Capitol Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 361,' 1958-1 US.
Tax Cas. 9121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936 (1958); Republic Supply Co., 66 T.C. 466
(1976).
46. Capitol Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 361, 1958-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9121 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936 (1958); Oppenheim's, Inc. v. Kavanagh, 90 F. Supp. 107, 1950-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 19249 (E.D. Mich. 1950) (found intent to make a capital contribution found in
excess profits tax case).
47. See Donald, supra note 16, §88-3d at A-5; Eustice, supra note 1, at 250.
48. Putoma Corp., 66 T.C. 652 (1976): "Respondent has argued his theory, a curious
combination of cancellation of indebtedness and tax benefit principles, in much the same
form for the last 5 decades, and has been consistently rejected. . . . Respondent simply
replays here an old record that is getting a bit scratchy. He might better, at this point in
time, play it in a different form." Id. at 668.
49. But see I.R.C. §267(a)(2), (b)(2) which mitigates the problem somewhat by disallowing deductions if an item remains unpaid for two and one-half months after the dose of
the corporation's taxable year to the shareholder owning more than 50 percent of the
outstanding stock.
50. See generally O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and the Ordinary
Principleof the Tax Benefit Rule in Taxation of Corporationsand Shareholders,27 TAx L.

R v. 215, 240-44 (1972).
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extent of the tax benefit received in prior years) and the assignment of income
doctrine (that the shareholder-creditor realizes income by virtue of his exercise
of dominion and control over the corporation).5
Several recent cases have addressed both approaches to alleged taxability.
The tax benefit argument has been urged by the Commissioner for a number
of years and has almost uniformly been rejected by the courts.5 2 Even when
the facts demonstrate an arguable exception to the rule of Kirby Lumber, the
Commissioner has maintained that the presence of a prior tax benefit should
override and that tax should be imposed. 52 In 1940, the Eighth Circuit so
held,5 4 but the Tax Court5 5 and the Second Circuit56 refused to follow suit.
The Supreme Court in the American Dental Co. case held that the gift
exception would apply to preclude taxability despite prior tax benefits
to the corporation. The American Dental Co. ruling has since been extended to hold that the gift exception should override any tax benefit
theory of inclusion.57 Furthermore, case law suggests that the gratuitous cancellation of an indebtedness by a shareholder constitutes a contribution to
capital, and this rule embraces both principal and accrued interest, regardless
of prior years' treatment of this interest for tax purposes. 58 After many years,
however, the Commissioner is making some headway, at least with the commentators59 and perhaps with the courts.60
In Commissioner v. Fender Sales, Inc.,61 two unrelated shareholders, each
owning fifty percent of the stock, were employed by the corporation for annual
salaries of $15,000 each. Three years of unpaid salaries were accrued and deducted by the corporation but not included (because not received) by the
shareholder-employees. These obligations for back salaries were discharged by
issuance of capital stock the fair market value of which equalled the salary
51. See Commissioner v. Fender Sales, Inc., 338 F.2d 924, 1965-1 U.S. Tax Cas. j9104 (9th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 813 (1965).

52. See note 48 supra.
53. Id.
54. Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp., 109 F.2d 933, 1940-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19280 (8th Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 672 (1940). See also Haden Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 285,
1941-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19331 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 622 (1941).

55. Commissioner v. Auto-Strop Safety Razor Co., 74 F.2d 226, 1935-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
19017 (2d Cir. 1934): "When the indebtedness was canceled [sic], whether or not it was a contribution to the capital of the debtor depends upon considerations entirely foreign to the
question of the payment of income taxes in some previous year." Id. at 227, 1935-1 U.S. Tax

Gas. 19017, at 9735.
56. Carroll-McCreary Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 303, 1942-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19183 (2d
Cir. 1941).
57. See Reynolds v. Boos, 188 F.2d 322, 1951-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19205 (8th Cir. 1951);
George Hall Corp., 1 T.C. 471, reconsidered, 2 T.C. 146 (1943).
58. Utilities &Indus. Corp., 41 T.C. 888 (1964).
59. See Donald, supra note 16, §88-3d at A-5 to A-6; Sanders, supra note 16, at 580.
60. The tax benefit theory was summarily disregarded in Commissioner v. Fender Sales,
Inc., 338 F.2d 924, 1965-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19124 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 813
(1965), but the assignment of income doctrine was applied to capture the escaped revenue.
61. 338 F.2d 924, 1965-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19104 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 813
(1965). See generally Egerton, Stock Distribution in Discharge of Service Obligations: Fender
Sales Limits Taxpayers' Joy, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 129 (1969).
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amounts due. Although the government urged that the shareholders had
received taxable income in the form of stock or, in the alternative, that the
cancellation of the debt was income to the corporation, the Tax Court decided
62
that neither the shareholders nor the corporation had taxable income. Citing
Carroll-McCreary Co. v. Commissioner,63 Commissioner v. Auto Strop Safety
Razor Co.,64 and American Dental Co., the Ninth Circuit held that the
corporation had received non-taxable contributions to its capital from the
shareholders whether viewed as payments for the stock of the corporation or as
65
the forgiveness by the shareholders of the corporation's indebtedness to them.
The shareholders, however, were found to be in receipt of taxable income. The
increase in the net worth of the corporation by virtue of the debt cancellation
was held to be an increase in the shareholders' corporate interest and this
taxable income
enhancement in value was "something of value constituting
66
under the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution."
The Tax Court again rejected an attempt by the Commissioner to use
the tax benefit rule to override the section 118 nonrecognition, contribution to
capital provision in Hartland Associates,67 in which a minority shareholder
forgave previously accrued interest on certain promissory notes. The Tax Court,
68
citing American Dental Co., Auto Strop, and Reynolds v. Boos, held that a
gratuitous forgiveness gives rise to no taxable income to the debtor regardless
of prior tax benefits. 9 The Hartlandopinion, unlike Fender Sales, is silent on
the question of who will bear the tax.70
71
A 1976 Tax Court decision by Judge Wilbur, Putoma Corp., again
addressed the problem of a cancellation of indebtedness for accrued interest by
two 50 percent shareholders. Unlike the Fender Sales shareholders, however,
the Putoma Corp. shareholders took no stock in exchange for their forgiveness.
The court discussed what it called "an interesting problem arising from the
convergence of two distinct rules of income inclusion - cancellation of indebtedness income and the tax benefit rule; and one rule of income exclusion
-'gratuitous' contributions to capital." 72 Analysis of the historical applications75 of the three rules led the Putoma Corp. court to conclude that the convergence of the rules caused the tax benefit rule to disappear under the
62. Fender Sales, Inc., 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 550 (1963).
63. 124 F.2d 303, 1942-1. U.S. Tax Cas. 9183 (2d Cir. 1941).
64. 74 F.2d 226, 1935-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9017 (2d Cir. 1934).
65. Commissioner v. Fender Sales, Inc., 338 F.2d at 930, 1965-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9104, at
94,512.
66. Id. at 927, 1965-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9104, at 94,514.
67. 54 T.C. 1580 (1970).
68. 188 F.2d 322, 1951-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9205 (8th Cir. 1951).
69. "Sections 102 and 118, which govern taxability of such cancellations, will not be
overriden by the abstract notion of tax benefit." 54 T.C. at 1586 (citing Reynolds v. Boos,
188 F.2d 322, 1951-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9205 (8th Cir. 1951)).
70. But see O'Hare, supra note 50, at 241.
71. 66 T.C. 652 (1976).
72.

Id. at 663.

73. The court notes that when income inclusion rules are overriden by the contribution
to capital exception, the court confronts "still another instance where 'a page of history is
worth a volume of logic."' Id. at 666.
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"canopy" of the Kirby Lumber rule and the Kirby Lumber rule to disappear
under the "canopy" of the contributions to capital rule.74 "In the end," stated
the court, "only the income exclusion principle is left standing."- The Fender
Sales case was distinguished because there the shareholders received stock in
exchange for the cancellation.76 The Fender Sales court's imposition of tax
on the forgiving shareholders was rejected by the Tax Court, which refused
7
to stretch the assignment of income doctrine to reach the facts at issue. "
Nevertheless, the court paid lip service to the tax benefit rule, stating, "while
a theoretically correct statement [of tax benefit rule] might indeed have merit
'
considered de novo, we hardly write on a clean slate."71
The Putoma Corp. court cited the recent case Estate of David Munter7
for the three elements of the tax benefit rule: an amount previously deducted,
which resulted in a tax benefit, and which was recovered during the taxable
year in issue.8o Because the Tax Court in Munter held that the tax benefit
rule will override section 337 statutory nonrecognition to create taxability,
commentators have suggested that the rule will be extended to override sections
118 and 1032 and perhaps other exceptions to the Kirby Lumber rule.s
Although the assignment of income doctrine appears to be an alternative
which the Commissioner will continue to argue because of his Fender Sales
success, other theories may be available on which a tax could be premised. Two
theories in this area that appear at least as tenable as the Helvering v. Horst,8 argument are constructive receipt of salary income by the taxpayer under the
all events test,8 3 and a section 482 argument that income is not clearly reflected
74. Id. at 663.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 669.
77. "Assuming Fender Sales, Inc., can be so read, it stands alone in suggesting that the
doctrine of Helvering v. Horst can be stretched to encompass the facts before us. We do
not believe the doctrine possesses any such resilience, and in this regard we specifically
decline to follow Fender Sales, Inc." Id.
78. Id. at 668.
79. 63 T.C. 663 (1975). The court in Putoma Corp. further states: "But where unpaid
interest has also been accrued and deducted on the loan, the disappearance of the cancellation of indebtedness rule should not automatically cause the tax benefit rule, a distinctly
different principle, to also vanish. That rule, designed to specifically apply to the recovered
interest, would appear to be left standing squarely in place, raising the question of whether
the tax benefit rules overrides any policy underlying section 118 (contributions to capital)." 66
T.C. at 665 (emphasis added). Twice in the opinion, the court notes that history prevails
over logic in this area. See note 73 supra.
80. See I.R.C. §111.
81. See, e.g., O'Hare, supra note 50, at 244: "[T]he recent overriding applications of the
rule in cases involxing section 337 should forestall any thought that sections 118 and 1032
are necessarily immune from attack under the rule."
82. 311 U.S. 112, 1940-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19787 (1940) (donor's gift of "interest coupons
detached from the bonds, delivered to the donee and later in the year paid at maturity,"
held the "realization of income taxable to the donor," id. at 112, U.S. Tax Cas. 9787, at
10,958).
83. See Anderson, Cancellation of Corporate Indebtedness Owed to Shareholder or
Officer, U.S. CAL. TAX INST. 107 (1954). The author also finds the situation "subject to
attack and likely to be overruled in future cases." Id. at 113.
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between the corporation and the shareholder so that the Secretary must re-

allocate income, deductions, or both.8 4
Legislative proposals in this area have varied. The American Law Institute
draft excluded contributions to capital from the definition of "cancellation"
of indebtedness, thus incorporating the judicial exception in this regard.8 5

The House draft, however, excepted contributions to capital regardless of
whether the creditor had a proprietary interest in the taxpayer or whether the

taxpayer was a corporation.88 This exception under the House draft has
justifiably been called "broad and extremely ambiguous." 1 The House draft
also expressly adopted the deductions approach to taxation of certain nonprincipal items, and thus would have accomplished by legislation what the
courts have largely been unwilling to do.ss
REDUCTION OF PURCHASE PRICE
The courts have generally found no taxable income when a debtor obtains,
by direct negotiations with his creditor, a reduction of the liability incurred
on the purchase of property still held by him if the property's fair market
value has declined so that it does not exceed the amount of the reduced debt.89
84. I.R.C. §482. See also Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(d)(5) (1976).
85. See App. A, §X115(e)(1) infra. See 1 ALI FED. INCOE TAX STAT., supra note 37,

§X115(e)(2) at 216-17.
86. See App. B, §76(a)(3) infra. This approach is not consistent with the current reasoning of the Tax Court. See, e.g., Republic Supply Co., 66 T.C. 446 (1976).
87. Eustice, supranote 1, at 273.

88. See App. B, §76(b) infra.
89. Commissioner v. Sherman, 135 F.2d 68, 1943-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9367 (6th Cir. 1943)
(taxpayers resisted liability of mortgage induced by fraud concerning property's value; settlement of suit by transfer of certain certificates of claim held a reduction in purchase price
of property, not a Kenan exchange); Helvering v. Kilian, 128 F.2d 433, 1942-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9487 (8th Cir. 1942) (respondent contracted to pay $80,000 instead of $100,000 for
property worth $60,000; difference held a reduction in price, not taxable income); Hirsch v.
Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656, 1940-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9791 (7th Cir. 1940) (purchase of
property for $29,000, obligation to pay $19,000 in the future; depreciation reduced value of
property to $8,000; negotiations reducing balance of debt owed by $7,000, viewed as a reduction of purchase price to $22,000, with gain or loss, if any, to be determined on a
future sale of the property); Ralph Berg, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1006 (1975) (transfer of 7,500
shares to an investor dissatisfied with his cost basis relative to cost basis of organizersshareholders held an adjustment of purchase price per share since the adjustment was
found to be required by the original investment agreement); Ralph W. Gwinn, 3 T.C.M.
(CCH) 548 (1944) (although parties did not speak of dealing in terms of a readjustment
of price, Hirsch principle applied since purchased stock had declined in value below the
adjusted indebtedness remaining due); Mark W. Allen & Co., I T.C.M. (CCH) 887 (1943)
(after a decline in value of land purchased partly on installment method, an agreement made
with creditors to settle the outstanding balance of $16,371.26 for $10,750; held a reduction in
purchase price due to land value decline not resulting in taxable income); Gehring Publishing Co., 1 T.C. 345 (1942) (after stock purchased partly on credit depreciated in value, and
two years later, the debtor sought, but failed to receive, a reduction of the price, giving
instead a note for the unpaid balance, the seller's acceptance, another four years later, of
$6,200 less than the balance due held to produce no taxable income); Pinkney Packing Co.,
42 B.T.A. 823 (1940) (when the buyer understood during negotiations that he could receive
a large discount on the purchase price by paying in cash, a cash payment of $75,000 made
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The debt reduction is considered a reduction or adjustment of the purchase
price of the property that reduces the debtor's basis in the property by the
amount of the debt reduced.90 The effect of this exception parallels that produced by sections 108 and 1017; the amount of allowable depreciation (if
the property is depreciable in the debtor's hands) is decreased, and the gain or
loss on resale or ultimate disposition of the property will be increased or decreased, respectively, as the case may be.
The exception is subject to several limitations. First, it applies only if
the current market value of the property is less than the outstanding debt prior
92
to reduction. 91 This can be illustrated by an example in which property
worth $100,000 is subject to a mortgage of $80,000. A reduction of the debt
amount to $60,000 will result in taxable income of $20,000, because the adjustment of purchase price exception will not apply, even though the property
was originally worth $200,000. (See Figure 1). On the other hand, if the
property is presently worth $70,000, then the exception will apply when the
indebtedness of $80,000 is reduced to $70,000. In this instance the $10,000 debt

on outstanding $125,000 note by vendee held not to result in income received by reduction
of the liability); Des Moines Improvement Co., 7 B.T.A. 279 (1927) (because buildings to be
constructed under executory contracts were not completed, reduction through renegotiation
of mortgages thereon held not taxable income but merely a reduction in the contract price
or cost of the buildings).
90. See Fulton Gold Corp., 31 B.T.A. 519 (1934). See United States v. Kirby Lumber
Co., 284 U.S. 1, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. 814 (1931) (Justice Holmes distinguished Kerbaugh-Empire
on the ground that there, "the transaction as a whole was a loss." Id. at 175, 2 U.S. Tax Cas.
814, at 2952); Helvering v. Killian, 128 F.2d 433, 1942-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19487 (8th Cir. 1942)
("The transaction out of which the supposed income arises must be viewed in its entirety."
Id. at 434.); Estate of Sherman, 44 B.T.A. 853, aff'd, 135 F.2d 68, 1943-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9367 (6th Cir. 1943) (court of appeals noted that the "critical fact" was gleaned from
looking at the transaction as a whole).
See Commissioner v. Sherman, 135 F.2d 68, 1943-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9367 (6th Cir. 1943)
("[T]he offer of settlement disclosed an intent to regard the adjustment as a reduction in
Id. at 70, 1943-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19367, at 9557). But see Ralph W.
the selling price ....
Gwinn, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 548 (19,44) ("The parties did not speak in terms of a readjustment
of price, and this allocation of the payment does not accord with petitioner's testimony as to
the method by which the amount was computed, but here again it is the ultimate effect
rather than the details of the treatment which calls for consideration." Id. at 551). See text
accompanying note 108 infra.
91. See Commissioner v. Coastwise Transp. Corp., 71 F.2d 104, 5 U.S. Tax Cas. 1288
(lst Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 595 (1934); John E. Montgomery, 65 T.C. 511 (1975): "The
exception does not apply where the secured property retained by the debtor has a value
equal to or in excess of the obligation." Id. at 521. See also Herman E. Londagin, 61 T.C. 117
(1973) (court found nothing to indicate that property did not have a value greater than the
mortgage on it); Ralph W. Gwinn, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 548 (1944): "In order to apply the
'readjustment or [sic] purchase price' theory of Hirsch v. Commissioner and its companion
cases, it becomes necessary to compare the value of the purchased property when the reduction in indebtedness occurred with the figure to which the debt was then reduced. If the
amount remaining due after adjustment continues to be as much as the diminished value
of the property, the necessary elements for application of the Hirsch principle, accompanied
by a corresponding reduction in the debtor's basis for the property, appear to be furnished,"
id. at 551. L.D. Codden & Bros., Inc., 37 B.T.A. 393 (1938).
92. See Donald, supra note 16, §88-3d at A-10.
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reduction will not be taxable but will serve to reduce the debtor's basis in
the property. (See Figure 2).
In the second example if the indebtedness were reduced to $65,000, so
that the value of the property after the reduction would exceed the debt by
$5,000, the tax consequences are unclear. Several alternative approaches have
been advanced. Under the first approach if the debt is reduced below market
value the exception is wholly inapplicable and tax will be imposed on the
entire forgiveness ($80,000 - $65,000 = $15,000).03 (See Figure 3, First ApFIGUIE 1
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93. See Sanders, supra note 16, at 576. This commentator suggests the first theory is
correct, the exception becomes wholly inapplicable if the value of the property exceeds the
reduced debt. This would also appear to be Eustice's position. He states the exception as
follows: "Where a liability is incurred on the purchase of property still held by the debtor,
which later depreciates to an amount below the face of the obligation, no taxable income

is realized to the debtor if by direct vegotitions with his
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proach). Under a second approach, the tax could be imposed only on the
amount by which the fair market value exceeds the reduced debt ($70,000
- $65,000 = $5,000; basis is reduced by the difference between the unreduced
debt and the property's value at time of reduction- $10,000). 94 (See Figure
3, Second Approach). A third approach disregards the market value of the
property relative to the reduced debt and holds the entire reduction free of
tax when the property's market value is less than the debt before reduction. 95
(See Figure 3, Third Approach).
The first approach produces a harsh result when the parties reduce the
debt to an amount just slightly below current market value in order to make
the entire purchase price, including amounts previously paid for the property,
more realistic than the original price. 96 The approach merely reflects adjustments of the outstanding debt while disregarding any part of the purchase
price previously paid. It also seems somewhat harsh because of the difficulty
of valuing certain properties, particularly those in fluctuating markets or those
without large markets. 97 If this rule prevails, then taxpayers must be careful
to document, using appropriately qualified appraisers, the fair market values
at the time of the debt reductions.
The third approach applies the adjustment of purchase price exception
based on the mere fact that the debt before reduction exceeds the property's
fair market value. This approach, however, does not take into account the
theoretical problem at issue.9 The reduction of purchase price exception was
prompted by the plight of the debtor who held property that had depreciated
in value so much that it could not be disposed of to pay off the debt incurred
in its acquisition. Thus it might be argued that the exception is properly
applied only to equalize the property value and the debt on the property.99
However, this argument assumes that market value and selling price are and
should always be the same and that below fair market value, debt reduction
becomes something for which the debtor should be taxed. But since creditors
the then value of the property." Eustice, supra note 1, at 244 (emphasis added). This statement implies that the exception applies when the debt is reduced "to" the value of the
property but not below. See 1 [1976] STAND. FED. TAx. REP. (CCH) §670.019.
94. 2 A. RABRIN & R. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INcomE, GIFr AND ESTATE TAXATION, §36.05(2)
(1972).
95. 2 RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMRIucA, FEDERAL TAX COORDINATOR, §J-7401, at 30, 143
(1977).
96. See Wilson, supra note 16, at 643.
97. The fact that the debtor and creditor must renegotiate with one another may itself
be indicative of a volatile market. One commentator finds support for this approach from
the failure of one court to even make a finding of fair market value. Wilson, supra note 16,
at 643. However, this argument is not persuasive because that court did find that the maximum fair market value was far less than the amount of the debt. Sele Gehring Publishing

Co., 1 T.C. 345 (1942).
98. But see Donald, supra note 16, §88-3d at A-10.
99. One commentator states that "the parties are agreeing that the original purchase
price was too high." Wilson, supra note 16, at 643. If this decision is reached after five years
of.payment on a ten-year mortgage, whether a readjustment of the debt to an amount ibelow
the current value will result in an overall fair price clearly reflective of the market is
.
uncertain.
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will seldom reduce a debt below the fair market value, it could be argued
that direct renegotiations should be allowed to produce the correct market
result.
The second approach, despite its complexity, might prove to be the best
alternative of those advanced. 00° It would apply the exception to that portion
of the debt which has long been recognized as within the exception and, perhaps more importantly, within the rationale of the purchase price reduction
exception. 1°1 Because it does not in every circumstance supply the best answer,
a fourth approach should perhaps be considered. The name of the exception,
"reduction of the purchase price," purports to adjust the original price. If this
is the desired result then the exception should apply when the cash and any
other items already paid plus the outstanding debt are not less than the
current fair market value of the property. Such an approach would impose tax
only to the extent that a "bargain sale" result is reached. (See Figure 4).
FIGuRE
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The reduction of purchase price exception has been limited to a situation
in which purchase money obligations are secured by the property.,0 2 The exception has been held inapplicable to cases that involved borrowings on property
100. Wilson, supra note 16, at 643.
101. "The debtor's basis for the property is reduced to the extent that his gain from
reduction of the debt is tax-free. If the non-taxable debt reduction exceeds his basis, perhaps because of prior depreciation deductions, the theory advanced in the text [second ap-

proach] could be used to argue that the excess of debt reduction over basis constitutes
taxable income. It would be difficult to say that a drop in market value caused by ordinary
depreciation motivated the credii or-vendor to adjust the purchase price." Wilson, supra note
16, at 643 n.143. But see text accompanying notes 105-106 infra.
102. Edward W. Edwards, 19 T.C. 275 (1952). But see Charles L. Nutter, 7 T.C. 480
(1946) (bank loaned money to debtor to purchase securities, that later became worthless;
conveyance to the creditor in discharge of the debt held a reduction of the purchase price of
the securities); see also Fifth Ave.- Fourteenth St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 453,
1945-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9115 (2d Cir. 1944): "To be sure, some cases have held that the
doctrine of the Kirby case is inapplicable where the reduced indebtedness is a purchase
money obligation, i.e., one incurred by the taxpayer in acquiring property. We consider such

a distinction irrational .... " Id. at 456-57, 1945-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9115, at 10,650.
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subsequent to purchase 03 and to cases in which the property could have been
sold free of the liability. 10 4 Another judicially created limitation on the application of the exception has been imposed when the property has previously been
sold by the debtor with the obligation reflected in the basis. 10 5 Finally, some
courts have required that the debt cancellation result from face-to-face renegotiation of the purchase price between creditor and debtor. 0 6 The negotiations must focus not on the debt reduction but instead on the purchase price
of the property. To this extent at least, the parties to the transaction might be
wise to document the nature and content of their negotiations in order to
bring the debt reduction within -the exception.' 0' Nevertheless the reduction
of purchase price exception has been applied when an obligation is discharged
by the debtor's conveyance to the creditor of encumbered property, 0 although
this transaction more clearly resembles a sale or exchange.
103. Lutz & Schramm Co., 1 T.C. 682 (1943) (mortgage placed on property during taxable
period following purchase); see Edward W. Edwards, 19 T.C. 275 (1952): "We think that it
would be factitious to say that the cost of his stock, that is the basis of his title, was reduced
by a subsequent and totally unrelated cancellation of an indebtedness." Id. at 281 (emphasis
added).
104. Edward W. Edwards, 19 T.C. 275 (1952): "Unlike the real property [in Helvering
v. Killian, 128 F.2d 433, 1942-2 U.S. Tax Cas 9487 (8th Cir. 1942) and Hirsch v. Commissioner,
115 F.2d 656, 1940-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19791 (7th Cir. 1940)], the stock in the hands of the
petitioner could. be sold without an encumbrance." Id. at 280. But see Charles L. Nutter, 7
T.C. 480 (1946).
105. B.F. Avery & Sons, Inc., 26 B.T.A. 1393 (1932). See also Willard Helburn, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 214 F.2d 815, 1954-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9513 (1st Cir. 1954).
106. Helvering v. American Chicle Co., 291 U.S. 426, 1934-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9512 (1934);
Commissioner v. Coastwise Transp. Corp., 71 F.2d 104, 1934-4 U.S. Tax Cas. 1288 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 293 U.S. 595 (1934): "We have carefully reviewed these transactions and can find
nothing therein that indicates they had anything to do with the purchase price of the
vessels. The parties dealt solely about the notes and their value and not about the ships or
their value." Id. at 105, 4 U.S. Tax Cas. 11288, at 4245. Fifth Ave.-Fourteenth St. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 147 F.2d 453, 1945-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9115 (2d Cir. 1944): "At any rate, that
distinction between Kirby Lumber and a case in which the reduced indebtedness is a
purchase money obligation; see note 102 supra, if valid, is limited to a case of a purchase
money obligation where the vendor-mortgagee, in negotiations directly relating to the purchase price, agrees to a reduction ....
" Id. at 457, 1945-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9115, at 10,650
(emphasis added).
107. See Donald, supra note 16, §88-3d at A-11; Sanders, supra note 16, at 577.
108. Commissioner v. Sherman, 135 F.2d 68, 1943-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9367 (6th Cir. 1943);
Charles L. Nutter, 7 T.C. 480 (1946). In Nutter, a debt of $84,000 was cancelled by transfer
of the encumbered property then worth $12,800, debtor's basis being $77,000. The debtor's
argument was that he had incurred a capital loss of $64,200, and the Commissioner argued
that he had $7,000 of capital gain (excess of cancelled debt over basis). The Tax Court
found that the whole transaction was subject to the exception so that no gain or loss was
recognized. The other side of this argument would presumably prevent recognition of gain
if the fair market value of the property exceeds basis. Note that in Helvering v. Killian, 128
F.2d 433, 1942-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9487 (8th Cir. 1942) and Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d
656, 1940-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9791 (7th Cir. 1940) the debtors attempted to convey the properties involved to the creditors but were refused. Had they done so, query whether the transactions should bve been viewed as reductions of the price of the properties or as sales in
accord with cases holding that a conveyance of encumbered property to a creditor is a sale
or exchange of property for tax purposes and not a discharge of debt.
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Several cases have indicated that the tax benefit theory will override the
reduction of purchase price exception.' °9 In view of the recently expanded
use of the tax benefit theory for the emasculation of statutory law, 110 it should
be considered a threat to the vitality of this already limited exception to
taxability.
The reduction of purchase price exception was rejected by the American
Law Institute in its proposed draft, although the optional basis reduction and
exclusion allowed to all taxpayers by that proposal would have been a satisfactory substitute reaching the desired result."' The House draft, on the other
hand, adopts the exception if the discharge occurs within twelve months of the
acquisition pursuant to which the debt was incurred." 2 The twelve-month
limit substantially narrows the exception, especially for application to real estate
transactions, as opposed to inventory transactions which more quickly adjust
to the market.
SALE OR EXCHANGE TREATMENT

A transfer of property, whether voluntary or involuntary, in discharge
of a debt may constitute a sale or exchange instead of cancellation of indebtedness income. The involuntary transfer by a foreclosure proceeding has been
held repeatedly to be a sale or exchange 11 3 so that gain is recognized to the

extent of the difference between the debtor's basis in the property and the face
amount of the debt."4 Neither the involuntary nature of the foreclosure nor
the presence or absence of personal liability in this situation"15 alters the
result.

1 6

109. See B.F. Avery Ic Sons, Inc., 26 B.T.A. 1393 (1932): "The use of fixed accounting
periods requires that the amount by which expenses, once deducted because paid or accrued,
are reduced by later adjustments must be taken into income in the year of the adjustment."
Id. at 1400. See John E. Montgomery, 65 T.C. 511 (1975): "This case is also distinguishable
from Hirsch since petitioner has previously deducted the amount here in dispute. Petitioner
deducted his entire adjusted basis in the buildings as a casualty loss in 1969. This figure reflected the face amount of the Kolden obligation allocable to the buildings. Where an obligation previously deducted is later cancelled in whole or in part, the reduction of purchase
price exception is inapplicable." Id. at 522 (emphasis added).
110. See Estate of David Munter, 63 T.C. 663 (1975).
111. See App. A, §§X116(a)(2), X121 infra.
112. See App. B, §76(a)(4) infra.
113. Electro-Chemical Co. v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 513, 1941-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9170
(1941); Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 1941-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19169 (1941); R. O'Dell &
Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 247, 1948-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9350 (9d Cir. 1948); Gavin
S. Millar, 67 T.C. 656 (1977).
114. Gavin S. Millar, 67 T.C. 656 (1977). See also Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-34 C.B. 12.
115. Helvering v. Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 666, 1941-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9361 (1941) (per curiam); Commissioner v. Fortee Properties, Inc., 211 F.2d 915, 1954-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 9324 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 826 (1954); Commissioner v. Abramson,
124 F.2d 416, 1942-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9200 (2d Cir. 1942); Welch v. Sweet, 116 F.2d 953, 1942-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 9211 (Ist Cir. 1941).
116. See R. O'Dell 9. Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 247, 1948-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9350 (3d Cir. 1948): "The taxpayer's interest in the mortgaged property constituted a
capital asset within the meaning of Section 117 [now §1221] of the Internal Revenue Code, 26
U.S.C.A. Int. Rev. Code, §117. The foreclosure of the mortgage by judicial sale and purchase
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Similarly, mortgaged property voluntarily transferred to the mortgagee in
discharge of the personal debt will be a sale or exchange, and if the property
is a capital asset, capital gain or loss will result. 117 Courts have also held,
however, that getting rid of burdened property can more closely resemble an
abandonment than a sale or exchange, especially if there is no personal liability
for the debt and the mortgagor does not receive consideration for the conveyance. 18 If the debtor receives any consideration for the transfer the
transaction will be deemed a sale or exchange." 9 But it should be noted that
the sale or exchange characterization may be overriden by the no personal
2
liability O
and the insolvency 2' exceptions to the cancellation of indebtedness
rule.
Two approaches have been urged for the computation of gain or loss from
a sale or exchange in this setting. The Regulations split the transaction into
two parts, with capital gain or loss measured by the difference between the
basis and the value of the property (assuming a capital asset), and with
ordinary cancellation of indebtedness income measured by the difference
between the value of the property and the amount of the debt. 22 The courts
have refused to follow this approach and instead measure gain from a sale or
of the real estate, was a sale or exchange of an asset within the meaning of §112(a) [now
§1002]. In these cases the Supreme Court held that no distinction was to be made between
forced and voluntary sales of capital assets." Id. at-248, 1948-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 19350, at 744
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
117. Rogers v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 790, 1939-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9490 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 580 (1939). In Rogers the court held a capital loss resulted from a sale or
exchange, stating: "'A sale, in the ordinary sense of the word, is a transfer of property for a
fixed price in money or its equivalent.'" Id. at 792 (quoting Iowa v. McFarland, 110 U.S. 471,
478 (1884)). See also Commissioner v. Green, 126 F.2d 70, 1942-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9277 (3d Cir.
1942); Pender v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 477, 1940-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9302 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
118. Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 335, 1941-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9770 (3d Cir. 1941)
(security surrendered to holder of mortgage bond held not a sale or exchange); Commissioner
v. Hoffman, 117 F.2d 987, 1941-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9280 (2d Cir. 1941) (per curiam)
(mortgagors' abandonment of interest in property which had become worthless with notice
to mortgagee held not a sale or exchange; ordinary loss allowed in year of abandonment
even though title remained in mortgagors until foreclosure proceedings the following year);
Polin v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 174, 1940-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9639 (3d Cir. 1940) (mortgagors'
"abandonment and surrender" of property held not a sale or exchange because it did not
relieve taxpayers of any liability and thus they received nothing in exchange). See also
Charles L. Nutter, 7 T.C. 480 (1946). But see Lutz & Schramm Co., 1 T.C. 682 (1943) (transfer
of property to mortgagee held a sale or exchange though mortgagor was not personally
liable).
119. Blum v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 447, 1943-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9283 (2d Cir. 1943)
(debtor's lawyer's receipt of $250 from mortgagee held a sale or exchange resulting in a capital
loss).
120. See Hotel Astoria, Inc., 42 B.T.A. 759 (1940); P.J. Hiatt, 35 B.T.A. 292 (1937).
See text accompanying notes 133-136 infra.
121. Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d' 95, 4 U.S.
Tax Gas. 1270 (5th Cir. 1934). See text accompanying note 178 infra. The insolvency exception is perhaps at its least logical when applied to this sale or exchange treatment. Query
whether any other taxpayer can assert freedom from taxability when he makes a capital
profit.
122. Treas. Reg. §1.1017-1 (1976).
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exchange by the difference between the face value of the debt discharged and
1
the debtor's basis.

23

Assume, for example, that a debtor owns a capital asset worth $100,000
with a basis of $50,000 and that she uses that property to discharge a debt of
$125,000. The split transaction approach would result in $50,000 of capital
gain and $25,000 of ordinary cancellation of indebtedness income. According
to the Regulations approach, the cancellation of indebtedness income portion
would presumably be subject to any judicial exceptions that might apply,
such as insolvency, or "no personal liability." In contrast, the approach adopted
by the courts would result in $75,000 of capital gain, entirely disregarding the
market value of the asset. 124 If the insolvency exception were applicable, this
approach would apply it to prevent recognition of the entire gain.125
The discharge of an indebtedness by the transfer of appreciated assets (other
than the encumbered property) gives rise to a sale or exchange.126 When the
123. R. O'Dell & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 247, 1948-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f9350
(3d Cir. 1948); Lutz & Schramm Co., 1 T.C. 682 (1943). In Gibbs v. Tomlinson, 362 F.2d
394, 1966-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19475 (5th Cir. 1966) the court of appeals stated: "The rule is
that the amount of income from the cancellation of indebtedness will be determined, in the
normal case such as this, by reference to the face amount of the obligation, and the actual
value of the indebtedness will not be considered." Id. at 397-98. See Rev. Rul. 111, 1976-1 C.B.
214.
124. The "footnote 37" issue in Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 n.37, 47-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. %9217, at 12,431 n.37, (1947) is likely to arise in a sale or exchange in connection
with debt cancellation. See text accompanying notes 142-147 infra. In Gavin S. Millar, 67
T.C. 656 (1977), a foreclosure action, the Tax Court unequivocally stated: "In the sale or
exchange of such stock, petitioners had a gain to the extent that the amount realized, in
this case the amount of the extinguished indebtedness, exceeded the adjusted basis of the
surrendered stock. . . . This Court has held that this result follows regardless of whether
the value of the property surrendered is less than the amount of the obligation ...
"In our opinion, the value of the stock was immaterial. Petitioners had received a cash
equivalent in the amount of the notes, whether they were personally liable on such notes or
not." Id. at 660-61 (citations ornitted). In a concurring opinion in Millar, Judge Sterrett,
joined by Judge Wiles, supported the imposition of tax on the amount in controversy (the
difference between the value of the property and the amount of the debt) noting that the
Crane basis has afforded the taxpayers increased tax losses by providing "a tax benefit of
economic substance" for which they must account upon disposition. Id. at 662 (Sterrett, J.,
concurring).
125. See generally text accompanying notes 171-175 infra. The rationale of taxation of a
gain when a debtor satisfies an obligation by transfer of a capital asset is based on the tax
consequences which would have resulted if he had sold the asset and applied the cash proceeds to satisfy the debt. In Unique Art. Mfg. Co., 8 T.C. 1341 (1947), the Tax Court stated
that: "Where a capital asset is thus transferred, the difference between the amount of the
liability extinguished and the transferor's basis of the asset is a capital gain or loss, for in
each case the transaction is treated as if the transferor had sold the asset for cash equivalent
to the amount of the debt and had applied the cash to the payment of the debt." Id. at 1342
(emphasis added). The court's rationale wavers when the asset will not bring the amount
of the debt, and it would seem that the excess of the amount of the debt over the value
of the property should be ordinary income because it could not be received in exchange for
the capital asset in the market. On the other hand, the cancellation of the debt constitutes
consideration of the debtor for the transfer, and application of the rule of United States
v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 1962-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9509 (1962), that the value of property transferred
is equal to that received, to the debtor's position may justify treatment as all capital gain.
126. International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310, 1943-1 U.S. Tax
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debt is unliquidated, its value and the measure of gain have been determined
1 27
by the value of the property transferred.
The availability of sale or exchange treatment has prompted the suggestion
that taxpayers contemplating a debt compromise, in which gain is expected,1 28
should transfer appreciated capital assets instead of paying cash. However,
section 108 nonrecognition election is apparently available only to defer cancellation of indebtedness income, not gain from the sale or exchange of
12 9
property.
The draft of the American Law Institute provided for split transaction
treatment, allowing gain on the disposition of property in the amount by
which the fair market value exceeds adjusted basis and requiring cancellation
of indebtedness income in the amount by which the face amount of the
debt exceeds the fair market value of the property. 1 0 A transfer of property
under the proposed House bill does not result in a split transaction, rather
gain is measured by the difference between the face amount of the debt
discharged and the basis of the property transferred, ignoring the subtleties of
the Regulations - ALl approach. 131
NATURE OF OBLIGATION CANCELLED

No PersonalLiability
If the indebtedness is simply a lien on property acquired by the debtortaxpayer and is not a personal obligation, no taxable income results from the
reduction of the debt through a payment in money of less than the total
outstanding debt. 8 2 In the case of a purchase money mortgage, the basis of the
Cas. 9334 (2d Cir. 1943) (delivery of shares to corporate employees as a bonus held a taxable
exchange, supported by consideration in the form of services rendered by employees); Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986, 1941-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9768 (3d Cir. 1941) (satisfaction of
marital obligation following divorce by transfer of appreciated stock held a sale or exchange),
cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695, rehearing denied, 317 U.S. 704 (1942); Kenan v. Commissioner,
114 F.2d 217, 1940-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9635 (2d Cir. 1940) (partial satisfaction of legacy by
transfer of appreciated stock, according to terms of will, held a sale or exchange); Suisman v.
Eaton, 15 F. Supp. 113, 1936-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9443 (D. Conn. 1935) (transfer of appreciated
capital assets in satisfaction of general legacy held a sale or exchange), af'd., 83 F.2d 1019
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 573 (1936). See also Unique Art Mfg. Co., 8 T.C. 1341 (1947);
Carlisle Packing Co., 29 B.T.A. 514 (1933); E.F. Simms, 28 B.T.A. 988 (1933).
127. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 1962-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9509 (1962); Commissioner
v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986, 1941-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9768 (3d Cir. 1941) cert. denied, 516 U.S. 695,
rehearing denied, 317 U.S. 704 (1942). See also Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d
812, 1947-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9218 (2d Cir. 1947); Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947).
128. Wilson, supra note 16, at 634.
129. Donald, supra note 16, §88-3d at A-14. See also Treas. Reg. §1.1017-1(b)(5) (1976).
130. See App. A, §§X116, Xl17, X118 infra.
131. See App. B, §76 infra.
132. Hotel Astoria, Inc., 42 B.T.A. 759 (1940) (no income recognized in satisfying a tax
lien, on which property owner was not personally liable, by the surrender of municipal
bonds purchased at a discount); Fulton Gold Corp., 31 B.T.A. 519 (1934) (held, no taxable
income realized but basis reduced as a result of the reduction of an obligation incurred on
acquisition of property); American Seating Co., 14 B.T.A. 328 (1928) (held, no income
recognized in the satisfaction of outstanding bonds not assumed by transferee taxpayer),
rev'd on other grounds, 50 F.2d 681; 5 U.S. Tax Cas. 1487 (7th Cir. 1931).
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property is reduced by the amount of the debt cancelled, 3 3 so that the profit
on the debt cancellation is reflected in the basis and will produce a result
similar to the reduction of purchase price exception that it "strongly resembles." 134 This exception also applies to situations in which a debt is
partially cancelled by the debtor's transfer to the creditor of appreciated
property with a cost basis of less than the total outstanding debt. 13 It does
not apply, however, to a mortgage foreclosure by the creditor or to a conveyance to the creditor of the encumbered property. 1" 6
This "no personal liability" exception is only applicable if the liability
being reduced is a purchase money obligation incurred in acquisition of the
property; thus, it is limited to cases in which the obligation is reflected in the
basis of the property at issue.137 If a loan contracted on the property after
acquisition is subsequently cancelled or reduced, the amount of the debt reduction would not be reflected in the property's basis, and thus would be
cancellation of indebtedness income to the debtor regardless of personal
38
liability.
The basis reduction created by application of this exception has been held
to require prospective adjustment only. Thus, depreciation deductions previously taken from the date of the property's acquisition are allowed. 39
The "no personal liability" exception may be illustrated by example.140
Assume a taxpayer bought property that is a capital asset in 1973 for $100,000,
paying $30,000 in cash and taking subject to a mortgage of $70,000 for which
she is not personally liable. In 1975, the taxpayer makes a payment of $35,000
on the mortgage and the mortgage is thereby cancelled by the mortgagee. The
taxpayer receives no cancellation of indebtedness income in 1975 because of
the application of the "no personal liability" exception, but the basis of her
property is reduced by $35,000. If she sells the property the following year
for $150,000, she will realize a capital gain of $85,000 computed as follows:
Amount Realized

$150,000
30,000
70,000
(35,000)

(Adjusted Basis)
Gain

65,000
$ 85,000

Sales Proceeds
Cash Purchase Price
Mortgage
Basis Reduction
Basis
Gain

133. See Eustice, supra note 1.
134. Id. at 238.
135. See Hotel Astoria, 42 B.T.A. 759 (1940).
136. See Gavin S. Millar, 67 T.C. 656 (1977); Eustice, supra note 1, at 237.
137. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 1947-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19217 (1947); Parker
v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455, 1951-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9112 (Ist Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
926 (1951); Mendham Corp., 9 T.C. 320 (1947) (partial cancellation of subsequent borrowings

does not fall into exception).
138. See Lutz & Schramm Co.. I T.C. 682 (1943); Donald, supra note 16, §88-3d at A-7 to
A-8; Eustice, supra note 1, at 238.
139. Blackstone Theatre Co., 12 T.C. 801 (1949).
140. See Donald, supra note 16, §88-3d at A-7.
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If she had retained the property after 1975, her depreciation deductions from
that year of basis reduction would have been recomputed and adjusted downward.' 41 Thus, this exception treats the investment and cancellation as parts
of a single tax transaction, but when personal liability on the debt exists the
courts consider the cancellation a realizable event in itself and gain is
produced before the property is sold or otherwise disposed.
A recent case brought before the Tax Court an argument urging the "no
personal liability" exception when nonrecourse debt is secured by the property
and when the property's value is less than the debt cancelled by transfer of the
143
property to the creditor. 142 This issue is the "legendary and unresolved"
problem created by footnote 37 in the landmark decision Crane v. Commissioner."' The Treasury takes the position that a capital gain or loss of the
difference between the amount of liability extinguished and the transferor's
basis in the asset is realized when a capital asset is transferred.145 The existence
of personal liability is considered immaterial, and the gain is determined on
the "foreclosure" pattern. Using the figures of the last example, assume the
taxpayer buys property in 1970; the purchase price is $200,000 payable
$10,000 cash and the balance in installments for which the taxpayer is not
personally liable but which are secured by the property itself. If in 1975 the
property had a fair market value of $150,000 and an adjusted basis of $165,000
and the taxpayer conveys the property back to the creditor in satisfaction of
the remaining balance due, $170,000, then the Treasury would impose a tax
on the difference between the $170,000 cancellation amount realized and the
taxpayer's adjusted basis of $165,000, or $5,000.46
In Millar v.Commissioner 44 the Third Circuit remanded the case to the
Tax Court to determine whether a debt rather than a gift existed and, if so,
whether the discharge of nonrecourse obligations should be included in the
amount realized from the sale or other disposition of stock by taxpayers when
48
the amount of debt extinguished exceeded the fair market value of the stock.
The Tax Court treated the transaction as a foreclosure"49 and imposed a tax
on gain amounting to the difference between the amount realized, here the
amount of the extinguished indebtedness, and the taxpayers' adjusted basis
141. Id.
142. Gavin S. Millar, 67 T.C. 656 (1977).
143. Donald, supra note 16, §88-3d at A-8.
144. 331 U.S. 1, 1947-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19217 (1947): "Obviously, if the value of the
property is less than the amount of the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable
cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently a different problem might 'be
encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or transferred it subject to the
mortgage without receiving boot. That is not this case." Id. at 14 n.37, 1947-1 U.S. Tax Cas.

9217, at 12,431 n.37.
145. See Woodsam Assocs., Inc., 16 T.C. 649 (1951); Rev. Rul. 111, 1976-1 C.B. 214.
146. Rev. Rul. 111, 1976-1 C.B. 214. See Donald, supra note 16, §88-3d at A-8.

147. 540 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1976).
148. Gavin S. Millar, 67 T.C. 656 (1977).
149. "When it became apparent that the corporation faced bankruptcy, Mr. Jamison

took the necessary steps to reacquire the stock in accordance with the terms of the notes. These
steps amounted to a 'foreclosure.' Such a foreclosure would constitute a sale or exchange of
the surrendered stock." Id. at 660.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol30/iss1/3

26

Powell: A Review of the Judicial Exceptions to the Kirby Lumber Rule
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXX

in the surrendered stock. This was held to be the correct result "regardless of
whether the value of the property surrendered is less than the amount of the
obligation."'150
Thus, it becomes apparent that a discharge of liability by a transfer of the
property securing the liability to the creditor will be treated as a sale or
exchange and should not be viewed as an opportunity to escape tax on the
discharge of a non-personal liability. The debtor who wishes to postpone
recognition of gain on encumbered property should still be able to take advantage of this exception, however, by transferring other assets in partial cancellation of, or cash in full cancellation of, the liability. Both the American
Law Institute draft 151 and. the House draft l5

2

addressed personal and non-

personal obligations, without distinction, except insofar as the ALl draft distinguished transactions involving the transfer of property. 53
Contingent or Disputed Obligations
The courts have held that the Kirby Lumber doctrine cannot apply to the
discharge of a contingent, contested, or unliquidated obligation. 54 The Regulations have adopted the judicial definition of an "indebtedness" that will
produce income upon cancellation; defining such as "an obligation, absolute
and not contingent, to pay on demand or within a given time, in cash or an1 5
other medium, a fixed amount."'
CONTINUATION OF LIABILITY IN A DIFFERENT FORM

DowngradingDebt into Equity
An exchange of debt paper for stock in the same corporation is regarded
by courts as the mere substitution of an equity claim for a debt claim, and
such an exchange does not give rise to cancellation of indebtedness income.156
150. Id.
151. See App. A, §X115(b) (1), (2) infra.
152. See App. B, §76(a) infra; see text accompanying notes 88 & 131 supra.
153. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
154. See, e.g., Ruben v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 926, 1938-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19451 (8th Cir.
1938): "None of the cited cases holds that merely to escape from a contested money claim
by the force of circumstances or the action of others, as Mr. Ruben did, makes a man subject
to tax as though he had gotten an income." Id. at 928, 1938-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9451, at 10,382.
See also Corporacion de Ventas v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 141, 1942-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9599
(2d Cir. 1942); N. Sobel, Inc., 40 B.T.A. 1263 (1939) (difference between amount paid in
settlement of litigated obligation and the amount of the note not taxable because no freeing
of assets). But see Eagle Asbesto,. & Packing Co. v. United States, 348 F.2d 528 (Ct. Cl. 1965)
(compromise with service); James R. Lockwood, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1462 (1968).
155. Treas. Reg. §1.108(a)-i (1960).
156. See Commissioner v. Motor Mart Trust, 156 F.2d 122, 1946-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9301 (lst Cir. 1946) (The court stated that "[iut would be economic nonsense to say that
the taxpayer thereby made a present realization of taxable gain when the bonds were
retired in the manner stated." Id. at 124, 1946-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9301, at 409); Commissioner
v. Capento Sec. Corp., 140 F.2d 382, 1944-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9170 (1st Cir. 1944) (exchange of
debt for stock held not taxable); Tower Bldg. Corp., 6 T.C. 125 (1946); Alcazar Hotel, Inc., 1
T.C. 872 (1943) (transformation of claims for interest and principal indebtedness into
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This result will occur even if the market value or the par value of the stock
is less than that of the debt exchanged. 57 Thus, the downgrading of debt into
equity is usually tax-free to the debtor corporation, because it is a capital transaction. 58 The argument has been advanced that such an exchange should be
treated as if the issuance of stock had been for cash and the money had been
used to satisfy the bond obligation, thus applying the Kirby Lumber rule. The
1 59
If the
courts have not been receptive to this "cash equivalence" argument.
stock held no taxable event); Hummel-Ross Fibre Corp., 40 B.T.A. 821 (1939) (exchange of
bond and interest coupon for preferred stock pursuant to a statutory reorganization held
not taxable), afjd and modified, 79 F.2d 474, 1935-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9589; Liquid Carbonic
Corp., 34 B.T.A. 1191 (1936) (conversion of bonds into capital stock held a nontaxable capital
transaction); 375 Park Ave. Corp., 23 B.T.A. 969 (1931) (exchange of preferred stock, par
for par, for outstanding bonds held a capital nontaxable transaction); Rev. Rul. 222, 1959-1
C.B. 80: "The substitution of common stock for debentures and unsecured claims does not
effect a cancellation, reduction or discharge of indebtedness, but rather amounts to a transformation from a fixed indebtedness to a capital stock liability." Id. at 82. But see Claridge
Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 962, 1943-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9663 (7th Cir. 1943) (exchange of bonds for stock held to be a cancellation of indebtedness and not a substitution
of liabilities because issuance of stock is not, according to Seventh Circuit, the same as
ordinary debt). rev'd on other grounds, 323 U.S. 141, 1944-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9532 (1944); A.R.
Purdy Co., 3 T.C.M. (CCII) 1059 (1944) (corporation held to receive taxable income on the
discharge of debt by transfer of its treasury shares to credit when corporation dealt in such
shares as it might have dealt in shares of a separate corporation). (Purdy should not be
followed because it preceded enactment of I.R.C. §1032.)
157. Commissioner v. Motor Mart Trust, 156 F.2d 122, 1946-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9301 (1st
Cir. 1946); "The offer of stock, with its accompanying equity rights in the company, was
good consideration for the surrender of the bonds; and this is so whether the par value of
the stock or its then market value was greater or less than the face value of the bonds."
Id. at 127, 1946-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9301, at 411.
158. See Commissioner v. Capento Sec. Corp., 140 F.2d 382, 1944-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9170
(1st Cir. 1944) (quoting Capento Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 691, 695 (1942)): "'To
substitute a capital stock liability for a bonded indebtedness may have its advantages, as
this case illustrates, but it cannot be called a present realization of gain. . . . Gain is not
realized by a corporation in the receipt of the subscription price of its shares .... .' Id.
at 386, 1944-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9170, at 10,259. See also Liquid Carbonic Corp., 34 B.T.A.
1191 (1936): "The ground upon which these decided cases [Pierce Oil Corp., 32 B.T.A. 403
(1935); 375 Park Ave. Corp., 23 B.T.A. 969 (1931); Chicago, R.I. &P. Ry., 13 B.T.A. 988 (1928),
aff'd, 47 F.2d 990 (1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 618 (1931)] stand is that the conversion of
bonds into capital stock of the obligor is purely a capital transaction; that is, a readjustment of the obligor's capital structure, which does not result in either a deductible loss or
a taxable gain. The obligor does not pay out anything. It merely readjusts its capital." Id.
at 1196 (emphasis added). See 375 Park Ave. Corp., 23 B.T.A. 969 (1931): "This was not a
loss to the corporation. It was a change in its capitalization. Instead of suffering the outlay
of money in excess of the amount borrowed, it created a new distribution of its shares, thus
avoiding its fixed financial obligation and devoting the borrowed money to the ordinary risks
of its business. A corporation pays nothing by issuing shares. It only readjusts its capital."

Id. at 973 (emphasis added).
159. See Capento Sec. Corp., 47 B.T.A. 691 (1942), afj'd, 140 F.2d 382, 1944-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9170 (1st Cir. 1944): "While it discharged that liability, it created a new stock
interest which became a balance sheet liability called capital stock. This is plainly different
from the discharge of its indebtedness by the payment of money in a less amount than the

indebtedness, as in Kirby Lumber Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 1, and the cases which have
followed it." Id. at 695 (emphasis added). See also 375 Park Ave. Corp., 23 B.T.A. 969 (1931):
"The petitioner argues that since the apparent intention was to treat the retirement as if
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stock exchanged has a par value which does not equal the amount of the debt,
the debt amount is sometimes considered to be the subscription price of the
stock, so that, depending on the facts, the stock may be considered to be issued
at a premium or a discount, 160 making the tax results neutral to the issuing
corporation. 6 '
Issuance of New Obligationsfor Old
If a corporation issues new obligations for cash and uses the proceeds to
retire its outstanding obligations for less than their face value, Kirby Lumber
will apply to produce cancellation of indebtedness income. 16 2 Of course, if the
new and old bonds are exchanged par for par, no gain or loss will be
recognized, regardless of a difference in market value of the old and new bonds
63
due to the interest rate or maturity date.1
If the cash value of the old obligations exceeds that of the new obligations,
the Kirby Lumber rule probably applies, because, to the extent of the
difference, the debtor's assets have been freed. The prominent issue in this
16 4
If
instance is not whether but when taxable income should be recognized.
the transaction is viewed as a cash sale of the new obligations and purchase at
discount of the old, then the entire gain should be from cancellation of indebtedness, and immediate recognition is required. On the other hand, the
transaction can be viewed as the substitution of one liability for another,
with the excess thus treated as a premium received on issuance of the new
debt and amortized over the life of the new obligations.-6 '
One commentator suggests that the cash equivalence theory will be applied
when the premium is high while the substitution of liability theory will be
applied to amortize relatively small premiums. 166 Thus the test would depend
cash had passed and since the effect was the same, its tax liability should be determined as
if cash had been paid by shareholders for the new shares and used by the corporation to
pay its bond obligations at par. But the facts must control." Id. at 973. See Eustice, supra note
1, at 239; Donald, supra note 16, §88-3d at A-11.
160. Commissioner v. Capento Sec. Corp., 140 F.2d 382, 1944-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9170 (1st
Cir. 1944).
161. I.R.C. §1032. But see A.R. Purdy Co., 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 1059 (1944).
162. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1814 (1931). See also
Helvering v. Union Pub. Serv. Co., 75 F.2d 723, 1935-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19099 (8th Cir. 1935)
(cash paid for new issue of bonds used to retire old bonds held two separate transactions, not
an exchange or continuation of liability, and thus loss allowed in year of retirement.
163. Great W. Power Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 543, 1936-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9185 (1936):
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Early, 52 F. Supp. 835, 1943-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9613 (E.D. Va.
1943). These cases dealt not with cancellation of indebtedness income but with the deductibility of premium amounts paid in connection with the exchange of old bonds for
new ones.
164. See Donald, supra note 16, §88-3d at A-12; Eustice, supra note 1, at 241.
165. Treas. Reg. §1.61-12(c)(2), T.D. 6984, 1969-1 C.B. 38.
166. For the cash equivalence approach, Eustice cites Stanley Co. of America v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 979, 1951-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19129 (2d Cir. 1951); Commissioner v. Coastwise
Transp. Corp., 71 F.2d 104, 4 U.S. Tax Cas. 1288 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 595 (1934);
New York, Chi. & St. L. R.R., 23 B.T.A. 177 (1931); Ernst Kern Co., 1 T.C. 249 (1942).
Eustice, supra note 1, at 241-42. For the substitution theory, Eustice cites Great W. Power
Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 543, 1936-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9185 (1936); Virginia Elec. &
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on whether "the difference between the principal amounts of the obligations
[was] so great as to be deemed a cancellation of part of the principal of the
old obligations," or whether it was instead "narrow enough to be deemed a
1 67
mere adjustment to the interest rate."
The courts point out that application of either theory is based on all the
facts and circumstances, including the interrelationship of the transactions,
the identities of the parties, and the timing of the new issue relative to the retirement of the old.168 The substitution theory should be forcefully argued on
behalf of debtor-corporations to avoid the telescoping of gain; the theory would
appear to have support in the Regulations, 16 and if the facts can be made to
conform to those previously enumerated by the Tax Court, even an exchange
170
involving a large premium might be treated as a substitution.
INSOLVENCY

The debtor who is insolvent during and immediately after a total or
partial discharge of an indebtedness does not realize taxable income. This insolvency exception was applied prior to the Kirby Lumber decision by courts
reasoning that a discharge under such circumstances did not constitute income in the constitutional sense.171 The Kirby Lumber decision contained
Power Co. v. Early, 52 F. Supp. 835, 1948-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19613 (E.D. Va. 1943). Eustice,
supranote 1, at 241-42.
167. Eustice, supra note 1 at 242. See Treas. Reg. §1.61-12(c), T.D. 6984, 1969-1 C.B. 38.
168. See, e.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Early, 52 F. Supp. 835, 1943-2 U.S. Tax Gas.
9613 (E.D. Va. 1943): "Whether the transaction was a purchase or a substitution is to be
determined under the factual situation which existed when the old bonds were retired and
not when they were issued ....
"An additional reason for determining that in the instant case the transaction was one
of substitution rather than purchase is the legal inter-relationship existing between the old
and the new bonds. The existence of the new bonds arose from and depended entirely upon
a surrender of the old bonds; the old and the new bonds were not in existence at the same
time; the parties were the same; and the original indebtedness as represented by the old
bonds continued without interruption (by virtue of the exchange) between the same parties,
being changed merely as to the form and date of maturity." Id. at 837, 1943-2 U.S. Tax Gas.
9613, at 10,176. See also South Carolina Continental Tel. Co., 10 T.C. 164 (1948): "Furthermore, the indisputable facts are that, to the extent of $387,000 principal amount, the issuance
of the new bonds was entirely dependent upon the simultaneous surrender of the outstanding
old bonds; that the old and the new bonds were not independent obligations existing at the
same time, but instead evidenced the same indebtedness between the same parties continuing without interruption, by virtue of the simultaneous exchange of substitution; and
that the only material change effected as to such continuing indebtedness was in .the rate of
interest thereon, the date of maturity thereof, and the form of the bond representing the
debt." Id. at 170. Accord, Durham Tel. Co., 7 T.C.M. (CCII) 49 (1948); Union Tel. Co., 7 TCM
(CCH) 42 (1948). See also Helvering v. Union Pub. Serv. Co., 75 F.2d 723, 1935-1 U.S. Tax
Gas. 19099 (8th Cir. 1935): "This transaction does not involve the substitution or exchange
of one issue of bonds for another. The holders of the two bond issues were obviously not the
same persons .... There is no interrelation or continuity of transactions, but in fact the
retirement of the old bonds and the issuance of the new constitute separate transactions .
"
Id. at 724, 1935-1 U.S. Tax .Cas. 9099, at 9422.
169. Treas. Reg. §1.61-12(c), T.D. 6984, 1969-1 C.B. 38.
170. - See Donald, supra note 16, §88-3d at.A-12.
171. Commissioner v. Simmons Gin Co., 43 F.2d 327, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1568 (10th Cir.
1930). These cases generally looked to the definition of income as gain derived from capital,
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language on which subsequent courts could hang relief for insolvent debtors
in receipt of debt cancellation "income": "it [taxpayer] made available
$137,521.30 assets previously offset by the obligation ... .172 Subsequently,
courts have continued to find no taxable income to insolvent debtors. They
have reasoned that if a debtor remains insolvent after a debt discharge, no
assets that were previously offset have been freed or made available, although
liabilities have been reduced, assets continue to be offset and "clear gain" is
not apparent. 73 To the extent a debtor is made solvent, however, he receives
taxable income in the amount of assets freed by the discharge. 7 4 Thus the
excess of assets over liabilities immediately after the discharge will be the
75
measure of the gain.1

"Insolvency" is determined generally by the strict bankruptcy test, under
which a debtor is insolvent only if the value of his assets is less than the
amount of his liabilities. 176 For this purpose, property exempt from creditors'
claims is not included in the determination.

77

from labor, or from both combined, citing Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 1 U.S. Tax Cas.
32 (1920) and Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. 174 (1926).
The courts thus distinguished between gain accruing to capital (not income) and gain
derived from capital (income). See Progress Paper Co., 20 B.T.A. 234 (1930); Eastside Mfg.
Co., 18 B.T.A. 461 (1929); Meyer Jewelry Co., 3 B.T.A. 1319 (1926).
172. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1814 (1931). See
text accompanying notes 12-15 supra.
173. Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 95, 4 U.S. Tax
Cas. 1270 (5th Cir. 1934): "In effect the transaction was similar to what occurs in an insolvency or bankruptcy proceeding when, upon a debtor surrendering, for the benefit of his
creditors, property insufficient in value to pay his debts, he is discharged from liability for
his debts. This does not result in the debtor acquiring something of exchangeable value in
addition to what he had before. There is a reduction or extinguishment of liabilities without
any increase of assets. There is an absence of such a gain or profit as is required to come
within the accepted definition of income." Id. at 96, 4 U.S. Tax Cas. 1270, at 4202 (emphasis
added). See also Haden Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 285, 1941-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9331 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 622 (1941); Transylvania R.R. v. Commissioner, 99 F.2d 69, 1938-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 9517 (4th Cir. 1938); F.W. Sickles Co. v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 654 (Ct.
Cl. 1940); Ralph L. Brutsche, 65 T.C. 1034 (1976); Federation Bank & Trust Co., 27 T.C.
960 (1957); Concstoga Transp. Co., 17 T.C. 506 (1951); Texas Gas Distrib. Co., 3 T.C. 57
(1944); Bulkley Bldg. Co., I T.C.M. (CCH) 528, 533 (1943) ("An insolvent corporation which
purchases its own bonds at less than face value, and is still insolvent after the transaction,
realizes no taxable gain for the reason that no assets are freed from the claims of creditors.");
Springfield Indus. Bldg. Co., 38 B.T.A. 1445 (1938).
174. See Haden Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 285, 1941-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9331 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 622 (1941); Ralph L. Brutsche, 65 T.C. 1034 (1976); Bulkley Bldg. Co.,
1 T.C.M. (CCH) 528 (1943); Lakeland Grocery Co., 36 B.T.A. 289 (1937).
175. See Capitol Coal Corp., 250 F.2d 361, 1958-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9121 (2d Cir), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 936 (1958); Ralph L. Brutsche, 65 T.C. 1034 (1976); B.M. Marcus Estate,
34 T.C.M. (CCH) 38 (1975); Herman Levy, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 120 (1960); Texas Gas Distrib.
Co., 3 T.C. 57 (1944).
176. See B.M. Marcus Estate, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 38 (1975) (life insurance proceeds payable
to decedent's wife not included in decedent's estate's solvency determination); Conestoga
Transp. Co., 17 T.C. 506 (1951) (the "going value" of business held a property which was
included in the determination of whether taxpayer was insolvent); Rufus S. Cole, 42 B.T.A.
1110 (1940) (value of equity in life insurance policies not included in insolvency determination when exempt under local law).
177. See cases cited note 176 supra.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1977

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 3
1977]

EXCEPTIONS TO KIRBY LUMBER

If the insolvency exception is applicable, other theories of taxation are
displaced. The exception is applied to the exclusion of sale or exchange treatment of capital assets when property is transferred in discharge of debt."78
Similarly, the courts have refused to apply the tax benefit theory to include
prior benefits received by currently insolvent debtors."79
Commentators have attacked the insolvency exception arguing that the
financial condition of the taxpayer is not a proper criterion in the definition
of income. This argument finds support in the absence of this criteria in
determinations of other types of income: salaries, interest, capital gains, windfalls, etc. 80
Although the exception has been attributed, with some justification,"' to
emotional reactions by courts to the plight of debtors in financial straits,12 it
can be supported on practical grounds. A discharge of indebtedness in bankruptcy does not result in taxable income because such a result would deter
creditors acting formally to effect an equitable division among themselves of
the bankrupt's property.'18 The creditors of a debtor who is insolvent but
not formally bankrupt would be penalized for attempting to salvage what
they could of the debtor's business by reducing or cancelling his liabilities84
To impose tax on debtors insolvent before and after a debt discharge would
178. Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 95, 4 U.S.
Tax Cas. 1270 (5th Cir. 1934). But see Home Builders Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 165
F.2d 1009, 1948-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19182 (5th Cir. 1948) (issue stated as not whether cancellation of indebtedness was income but whether there was a gain or disposition of installment
contract). See also Giblin v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 692, 1956-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19103 (5th
Cir. 1955) (regulation on contribution to capital exception not applicable if taxpayer is insolvent).
179. See Highland Farms Corp., 42 B.T.A. 1514 (1940): "In numerous cases it has been
held that a taxpayer must include in taxable income amounts recovered in the taxable year
where deductions in respect of such amounts have been taken in prior years....
"Despite the fact that petitioner has been allowed deduction in earlier years for interest
paid to Fidelity, the income to petitioner, if any, was received solely in the form of a
cancellation of indebtedness, and this fact adequately distinguished the instant proceeding
from the cases above cited," id. at 1320-21 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Towers &
Sullivan Mfg. Co., 25 B.T.A. 922 (1932). See also Ralph L. Brutsche, 65 T.C. 1034 (1976)
(neither a statutory nor a judicial tax benefit rule held applicable to exclude cancellation
of indebtedness income of Subchapter S corporation since there was no showing that the
item deducted was recovered, "even if we assume that the tax benefit rule is applicable to
the shareholders of the corporation for amounts recovered by the corporation, which we do
not." Id. at 1066).
180. See Eustice, supra note 1,at 246-48; Sanders, supra note 16, at 578.
181. See, e.g., Transylvania R.R. v. Commissioner, 99 F.2d 69, 1938-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9517 (4th Cir. 1938): "The argument that a gain was made equivalent to the difference
between the par value of the bonds and the price paid is a highly technical one that should
have no weight as against the equities of the situation." Id. at 71, 1938-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9517,
at 10,558. Query whether imposition of tax bears references to the "equities" of any situation.
182. Eustice, supranote 1, at 246.
183. I.T. 1564, 11-1 C.B. 59 (1923).
184. Of course, the government may logically choose to remain blind to such matters
and insist that both those taxpayers who manage to stay in the black and those who do not, be
treated alike in the computation of cancellation of indebtedness income. In this regard, it
might be argued that the insolvency exception excuses tax liability in violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol30/iss1/3

32

Powell: A Review of the Judicial Exceptions to the Kirby Lumber Rule
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXX

be to drive them further under, to the detriment of creditors and government alike. 8 5 Nor would such results be consistent with the rationale supporting cancellation of indebtedness income: to free assets previously offset by
liabilities. If liabilities continue to exceed assets, this freeing of assets has not
in fact taken place. 18 6 Courts sometimes note in insolvency exception cases
that taxation is imposed on real economic gain, not balance sheet improvements.1 87 Arguably, such gain does not exist until the taxpayer has assets at
least equal to liabilities.
Nevertheless, the fact that a business insolvent for bankruptcy purposes
can have a viable economic life, as emphasized by the Tax Court's willingness
to look at "going concern" value, is some indication that the insolvency exception is too extreme a departure from normal income tax concepts. 188
The Second Circuit has developed a different version of the exception,
finding no taxable income if an insolvent debtor purchases its debts for an
amount equal to or greater than the amount which would have been received
by creditors upon liquidation. A discharge for a lesser amount will give rise to
taxable income to the extent of the difference. 8 9
Finally, it should be noted that the courts reach inconsistent results in the
application of the insolvency exception. The Fifth Circuit has held that the
partnership rules in Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code will apply to
the exclusion of this exception on a cancellation of a partnership's indebtedness.' 90 The Tax Court, however, held the cancellation of indebtedness rules
and the insolvency exception applicable to Subchapter S corporations.' 9'
185. The insolvency exception is so well entrenched in the tax law that only congressional mandate could dislodge it. Nevertheless, because the bankruptcy test of insolvency
is subject to criticism, perhaps it should be replaced by the "inability to pay debts as they
mature" test. This would prevent the exception from operating to free debtors from tax
liability if they realistically do not require the subsidy. See text accompanying notes 192-194
infra.
186. It could be argued, however, that the computation of gain or loss should be made
on an asset by asset basis. In this event, when creditor A cancels debt on asset A, that asset
is freed, though others may not be. See Home Builders Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 165
F.2d 1009, 1948-1 U.S. Tax Cas. %9182 (5th Cir. 1948) (excess profits tax imposed): "Both the
solvent and the insolvent may receive profits and be liable for the tax thereon. It stands out
clearly that when the contracts were sold a profit of $22,908.34 was realized, and it is immaterial whether or not the proceeds of the sale were sufficient to pay the indebtedness of
the taxpayer in full. The tax was not on that part of its indebtedness which it may not
have been able to pay by reason of its alleged insolvency. No debt was forgiven nor [sic]
cancelled." Id. at 1011, 1948-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9182, at 209. Query whether policy reasons
exist for different treatment here than that accorded situations involving the federal income
tax.
187. See, e.g., Burnet v. John F. Campbell Co., 50 F.2d 487, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. f729 (D.C.
Cir. 1931): "The fact that after the transaction the plaintiff's balance sheet had improved was
not sufficient to constitute 'a gain derived from capital.'" Id. at 489, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. %729, at
2727 (quoting Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 300 F. 938, 944 (1924), aff'd, 271 U.S. 170 (1926)).
188. See notes 3 & 16 supra.
189. Fifth Ave. -14th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 453, 1945-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
19115 (2d Cir. 1944).
190. Stackhouse v. United States, 441 F.2d 465, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19352 (5th Cir. 1971).
191. Ralph L. Brutsche, 65 T.C. 1034 (1976).
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The one exception to cancellation of indebtedness income in the American
Law Institute draft was in the case of insolvency. 19 2 However, instead of the
net assets test, the Institute adopted a definition of insolvency which included
a formal proceeding, conducted pursuant to court or government agency
authority, in the nature of a bankruptcy, insolvency or similar proceeding.1 3
In the alternative, insolvency could mean any creditor arrangement made
when a formal proceeding could have been instituted and in which substantially all of the creditors of the debtor were involved. 194 This draft
represents a commendable tightening of the insolvency exception. 195 The
House draft, in what may represent an excessive tightening, did not include
the insolvency exception. 98
OvERALL Loss ON TRANSACTION

The controversial -9 decision of Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co.,'9 decided
by the United States Supreme Court in 1926, is the source of another judicial
exception to the rule of cancellation of debt income recognition. This exception applies if the originally borrowed funds have been dissipated by the debtor
to the extent that when the total or partial debt cancellation occurs no overall
gain is realized but rather an economic loss results. 199 Thus, the "overall loss

192. See App. A, §§Xl16(a)(1), X120 infra.
193., Id. §X120(a).
194, Id. §X120(b).
195. See notes 184-186 supra. The definition of insolvency is intimately related to the
economic result reached by application of this exception. This is clearly an area in which
economists could provide invaluable input relative to the incidence of the tax burden by
study of the "insolvent" and the nearly "insolvent." In this regard, one commentator appropriately introduces the subject by noting the volume of formal proceedings instituted to
extricate debtors from these financial straits. Blattner, supra note 16. Armed with such
information, perhaps legislators could more easily weigh the policy questions at issue, including their tax expenditure budget and regulatory features. See text accompanying notes
180-188 & 195 supra; and note 4 supra.
196. HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REPORT TO ACcOMPANY H.R. 8300, H.R. REP.
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d. Sess. 12 (1954), reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4025, 4036-38.
197. See Willard Helburn, Inc. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 815, 1954-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9513 (1st Cir. 1954), which refers to Kerbaugh-Empire as "a frequently criticized and not
easily understood decision." Id. at 819, 1954-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9513, at 46,328.
198. 271 US. 170, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. 174 *(1926).
199. Fashion Park, Inc., 21 T.C. 600 (1954): "This question of whether gain has been
realized upon retirement of corporate obligations for less than face value has arisen under
various different and sometimes perplexing facts, but the decision in each type of case is
predicated upon a determination as to whether there has been in fact an increase in the
taxpayer's assets by reason of the transaction ... if it has received upon issuance of its bonds
an amount less than it paid for their retirement it has no accession in assets but is in fact
poorer by the transaction.... A recognition of this basic principle is found in [Kerbaughemfpire] where it wds held that, as the result of the transactionleft the taxpayer with a loss,
no gain could be computed although one of the steps in the transaction was represented by
the reduction of liabilities for a lesser amount." Id. at 606 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
."
' ""
"..

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol30/iss1/3

34

Powell: A Review of the Judicial Exceptions to the Kirby Lumber Rule
UNIVERS'ITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXX

'
on transaction ' 200
or the "borrowed funds dissipated" 20 1 characterizations
both describe this exception.
Although there was an eight year interim between the borrowing and the
cancellation in the Kerbaugh-Empire case, the Supreme Court viewed the transaction as a whole and permitted the gain in the latter year to offset part of
the earlier loss.2O2 The benefit of this decision to debtors has been substantially

diluted by the creation of the annual accounting concept, 202 but later courts

have nevertheless been careful to preserve the exception, relying on the
Kirby Lumber "increment in assets" rationale.2 0

4

The cancellation in Kerbaugh-Empire might have produced income from
the satisfaction of a debt at discount to the debtor because of currency market
fluctuations. There the loan was payable in German marks, thus providing
the debtor with a partial debt reduction at a time when the value of the dollar
had risen against the mark. Accordingly, the decision has been raised in other
cases in which domestic taxpayers receive foreign inventory on credit and
subsequently make a currency profit upon payment of the debt. But the courts
have made it clear that, to qualify, these debtors must show an overall loss on
the sale of the inventory for which the debt was incurred.2 0 5 Thus, this already
200. See Blattner, supra note 16, at 253; Donald, supra note 16, §88-3d, at A-9.
201. See Eustice, supra note 1, at 242.
202. 271 U.S. at 170, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. 174, at 1432: "The result of the whole transaction
was a loss.... [T]he mere diminution of loss is not gain, profit or income."
203. Burnett v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. 636 (1931); Bradford v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 935, 1956-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9552 (6th Cir. 1956) ("It is also
a well settled general rule that each year's transactions are to be considered separately, without regard to what the net effect of a particular transaction might be if viewed over a period
of several years." Id. at 938, 1956-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9552, at 55,489.); Waynesboro Knitting Co.
v. Commissioner, 225 F.2d 477, 1955-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9631 (3d Cir. 1955) ("[I]t has been
specifically noted by the Supreme Court that this rule does not apply merely because the
end result of a transaction or series of transactions extending over a period of years turns
out to be a loss." Id. at 479, 1955-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9631, at 55,702).
204. See Bradford v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 935, 1956-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9552 (6th Cir.
1956): "[Kerbaugh-Empire] is nonetheless a decision which has not been overruled. Whatever
validity the Kerbaugh-Empire Co. decision may now have on its own facts, it remains an
authority for the proposition that in deciding the income tax effect of cancellation of indebtedness for less than its face amount, a court need not in every case be oblivious to the
net effect of the entire transaction." Id. at 938-39, 1956-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9552, at 55,489. See
also Commissioner v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. Co., 172 F.2d 1010, 1949-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9163 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 939 (the increase in net assets constitutes taxable
income in the year in which the transaction takes place); Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co., 22
B.T.A. 1277 (1931), aff'd, 61 F.2d 751, 3 U.S. Tax Gas. 991 (2d Cir 1932): "It is not enough
to speak only of buying and retiring bonds for less than par; the question is whether there
has been gain under all the circumstances, and this requires consideration of all that has
been received or accrued on the one hand and given up on the other." Id. at 1279; C. Ludwig
Bauman & Co., Brooklyn, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 188 (1943): "This transaction [liquidation of a
note for half its face value] did not increase the assets of petitioner, but merely served to
reduce its liabilities ....
There is no actual enrichment or the freeing of assets under the
facts in this case." Id. at 190.
205. Willard Helburn, Inc. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 815, 1954-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9513
(1st Cir. 1954): "We think the rationale of Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co. is not applicable
to the case at bar, since the present taxpayer has made no contention that the net result
of its transaction in purchasing lambskins with borrowed foreign exchange was a loss greater
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limited exception is apparently further narrowed by a substantial evidentiary
20 o
burden.
INITIAL RECEIPT OF CONSIDERATION FOR
INCURRENCE OF THE LIABILITY

A final exception to the Kirby Lumber rule establishes the nontaxability of
cancellations not derived from debts that are originally traceable to an increment in the debtor's assets.207 The Kerbaugh-Empire requirement that
courts look to the whole transaction is again applied to determine whether
there has been a net economic gain.208 If the debtor received nothing at the
time the debt was incurred this exception will apply because the debtor could
not have realized a net gain or increment in assets from the discharge of that
debt.
For example, if a corporation issued bonds to its shareholders as a
dividend and the bonds were later purchased in the market by the corporation
for less than the face amount, the exception has been applied. 209 The
corporation had written up the value of its assets and entered the appreciation
on its books as capital surplus and then issued the bonds having a face value
equal to the amount of the write-up. The court held that the corporation had
received no tangible consideration for the incurrence of the liability and hence

would not be taxed on the partial cancellation thereof. 210
The exception should also apply to prevent the inclusion of debt cancellation income derived from a partial discharge by repurchase of bonds that were
originally issued at a discount instead of at face value.211 There, it is only
than the income realized by reason of petitioner's profitable repayment of the loan, or even
any loss at all." Id. at 819, 1954-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9513, at 46,328. See Church's English Shoes,
Ltd., 24 T.C. 56 (1955), affd per curiam, 229 F.2d 957, 1956-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9271 (2d Cir.
1956): "In this case petitioner has not shown that the merchandise which it purchased in
1935 was sold at a loss, if it was. Petitioner only shows that there was an operating loss sustained for all of its businesses for each fiscal year ending on June 30, 1936 and 1937. Such
net operating losses might have been the result of [other] unprofitable transactions." Id. at
59.
206. See note 9 supra. See Capitol Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 36, 1958-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 9121 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936 (1958).
207. "When the loans were made and notes given, the assets and liabilities of defendant
in error were increased alike. The loss of the money borrowed wiped out the increase of
assets but the liability remained." Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire, Co., 271 U.S. at 175, 1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 174, at 1432 (emphasis added). See also Ruben v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 926, 1938-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 19451 (8th Cir. 1938); Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F.2d 751, 3 U.S.T.C.
991 (2d Cir. 1932) (Exception held applicable when there was no initial increase in assets,
when the "giving of the obligation certainly added nothing to income" Id. at 752, 3 U.S.
Tax Cas. 991, at 3423.); Fashion Park, Inc., 21 T.C. 600 (1954).
208. See Bradford v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 935, 1956-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19552 (6th Cir.
1956); Fashion Park, Inc., 21 T.C. 600 (1954).
209. Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F.2d 751, 3 U.S. Tax Cas. 991 (2d Cir. 1932).
210. Id.
211. See Kramon Development Co., 3 T.C. 342 (1944) (if mortgage bonds were issued
at discount, their retirement at less than face amount did not result in taxable income
since "the difference between purchase price and face value is significant only where there
is not discount upon issuance." Id. at 342).
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proper to tax the corporation on the difference between the issue price (plus
discount already deducted)"? and the purchase price of the bonds.1,3
The receipt of consideration upon incurrence of the liability may of course
take the form of money or property, but the commentators concur that it may
also be satisfactory for the debtor to receive services or the use of rental
property or money.2 14
The definition of "indebtedness" in the American Law Institute draft included only obligations incurred for money borrowed,215 or obligations incurred on the acquisition of property in which the debt was included in the
taxpayer's basis. 21 6 Unlike the House draft, which did not expressly address this

exception, this provision amounted to an express adoption of the exception
for "no consideration received on incurrence of the debt." 217
CONCLUSION

While the 1976 enactment of a new tax reform act would have been a
good time to resolve some of the more stubborn issues involving debt cancellation which have plagued the courts, no provision was forthcoming.
The Commissioner's distaste for "free deductions" received by accrual
method taxpayers for amounts of debts never actually paid to cash method
taxpayers has caused a significant problem."1s The reduction of purchase price
exception becomes uncertain when the current debt is reduced below current
fair market value.219 These issues and others arising in this context need to
be addressed through a comprehensive statutory scheme that exhibits both
certainty and consistency.
In addition, the Crane issue 20 should not be resolved by the courts on a
case by case basis, but instead warrants a frontal attack by Congress. Moreover, the merits of cash equivalence arguments22 and tax benefit theories for
the imposition or prevention of tax 2 22 are matters to which Congress should

address itself because of the persistence of the Commissioner and the justifiable
hesitation of the courts in this pervasive problem area. The insolvency excep212. The tax benefit rule is sometimes mentioned in relation to this exception, because
if a corporate debtor, for example, is able to take deductions for a liability even though receiving no initial consideration for its incurrence, income may be realized from that real
economic benefit. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F.2d 751, 3 U.S. Tax Cas. 991
(2d Cir. 1932).
213. See Treas. Reg. §1.61-12(c), T.D. 6984, 1969-1 C.B. 38, which would apply to
premiums on issuance the principle discussed in this text with respect to discounts.
214. Donald, supra note 16, §88-3d at A-10; Eustice, supra note 1, at 244; Sanders,
supra note 16, at 579-580. See also Bradford v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 935, 1956-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. %9552 (6th Cir. 1956): "[T]he taxpayer received nothing of value when the indebtedness
was assumed." Id. at 939, 1956-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9552, at 55,490 (emphasis added).
215. See App. A, §Xl15(c)(1)(A) infra.
216. Id. §Xl15(c)(1)(B).
217. Id.
218. See text accompanying notes 48-81 supra.
219. See text accompanying notes 93-101 supra.
220. See text accompanying notes 122, 123 & 143-150 supra.
221. See text accompanying notes 158 & 159 supra.
222. See text accompanying notes 48-81 supra.
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tion applied by the courts and criticized by commentators, stands out as an
established variance from general principles that no tax should be based on
the financial condition of a taxpayer. 223 Because it is such a departure, a congressional mandate would bolster its validity under the federal constitution and
could, if effectively drafted, reduce the instances when it applies to burden
other taxpayers unfairly.
Logic requires that the clearly overwhelming research resources of Congress224 be applied to reach a result that can be more readily applied by the
courts. Furthermore, it is not the province of courts to legislate. The Constitution requires that federal taxation be imposed by the legislature, which,
225
unlike the judiciary, consists of elected representatives of the people.
The need for legislative input has been apparent for many years, but
it is heightened now because of inflationary pressures which for political
reasons may prevent stepped-up revenue gathering through tax increases. The
less visible and, therefore less politically costly alternative, is to increase the
return from the existing system by placing more emphasis on enforcement.
It is reasonable to expect an increased willingness by the Commissioner to
litigate on behalf of the government. For taxpayers, this emphasizes the need
for clarification from Congress; but while logic has been on vacation for
several decades, 22 6 Congress has been, regrettably, out to lunch.
VICTORIA J. POWELL
223. See text accompanying notes 171-196 supra.
224. The House bill proposed in 1954 was the product of a tax revision study taking
nearly two and one-half years. The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation prepared
questionnaires from which 17,000 replies-were received. The Ways and Means Committee
heard 504 witnesses and accepted 1,000 statements for the record. 100 CONG. REC. 8993 (1954)
(Senate hearings on HR 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954)).
225. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, §1, cl. 8(1), amend. XVI.
226. See text accompanying note I supra.
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APPENDIX A
2. CANCELLATION OF INDEBTEDNESS

Section
Section
Section
Section

X115.
Xl 16.
X117.
X118.

Scope of Cancellation of Indebtedness Provisions
When Income Results from Cancellation of Indebtedness and Amount Thereof
Capital Gain Treatment in Certain Cases of Cancellation of Indebtedness
Special Loss Offset Where Property Is Conveyed in Connection With the
Cancellation of Indebtedness
Section X119. Treatment of Discount and Premium
Section X120. Exclusion in Insolvency Situations
Section X121. Optional Exclusion of Income from Cancellation of Indebtedness and Qualifying Basis Adjustment
SECTION X 115. ScoPE OF CANCELLATION OF INDEBTEDNESS PROVISIONS

(a)-General Scope. (1) Qualification of indebtedness. - Section X115 through X121 apply only to those
obligations which are of the type described in subsection (b) and which originated in a
manner described in subsection (c).
(2) Qualification of Cancellation. - Section XI15 through X121 apply only to those
forms of relief from obligations which are described in subsection (d) and which are not,
because of the circumstances under which the relief is effected, excluded from coverage
by subsection (e).
(b) Types of Obligations Covered. - Only the following types of obligations are covered
by the term "qualifying indebtedness":
(1) Personal Liability. - Personal obligations of the taxpayer.
(2) No Personal Liability. - Obligations in respect of property of the taxpayer.
(c) Origin of Obligations Covered. - Only obligations which originated in the following
ways are covered by the term "qualifying indebtedness":
(I) Consideration for Obligation. - An obligation incurred or assumed by the taxpayer (A) for money borrowed, but not for interest thereon; or
(B) for property acquired if the unadjusted basis to the taxpayer included the
amount of the obligation; or
(C) services used in the production of goods if the cost of the goods included
the amount of the obligation.
(2) Judgments. - An obligation imposed on the taxpayer as a judgment to enforce
a qualifying indebtedness of the taxpayer.
(3) Substitute Obligations. -An obligation incurred or assumed by the taxpayer in
exchange or substitution for a qualifying indebtedness(A) of the taxpayer; Or
(B) of another person in connection with a transaction in which the taxpayer
acquired property with a substituted basis.
(d) Forms of Cancellation or Other Relief Covered. - "Cancellation" covers only the
following forms of relief from obligations:
(1) Discharge. -The discharge, by any method other than merger by judgment, of a
qualifying indebtedness of a taxpayer.
(2) Barring of Remedial Rights.- The barring of the remedial rights of a creditor
with respect to a qualifying indebtedness of a taxpayer.
(e) Sections Inapplicable to Cancellations Effected For Certain Purposes. - Sections X 115
through X121 shall not apply to any cancellation of qualifying indebtedness to the extent
that the cancellation is effected as any of the following transactions:
(1) Contribution to Capital. - A contribution to capital of a corporation.
(2) Exchange of Stock. -- A consideration to a corporation for shares of its capital
stock.
(3) Gifts and Other Items Excluded from Gross Income. -A gift, bequest, devise, or
inheritance or any other item not included in gross income under section X107.
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(4) Other Taxable Items of Income.-A dividend salary, or any other item of
income enumerated in section X105(b), except income from the cancellation of qualifying
indebtedness.
(f) Definitions. (1) Obligation.- "Obligation" means a personal obligation or an obligation in respect
of property.
(2) Personal Obligation. - "Personal obligation" means an obligation as principal
(and not as surety) to pay a sum certain in money.
(3) Obligation in Respect of Property. -"Obligation in respect of property" means
an obligation which constitutes a burden on particular property and which carries no
personal liability to pay a sum certain in money.
and "assumption" include the acquisition of property
(4) Assumption. -"Assumed"
subject to an obligation which was a lien on the property.
(g) Cross Reference to Treatment of Obligations Allowed As Deductions. - For the
treatment of a discharge of an obligation not considered as a cancellation of qualifying indebtedness, where the obligation was incurred or assumed for an amount which was allowed
as a deduction from gross income, see section X332.
Cross References to Defined Terms Not Contained in Section X12
Bequest, Devise, Inheritance: section X107(a)(3)(b)
Contribution to Capital: section X107<k)
Gift: section X107(a)(3)(A)
Unadjusted Basis: section X276
SECTION

X116.

WHEN. INCOME RESULTS FROM CANCELLATION OF INDEBTEDNESS
AND AMOUNT THEREOF.

(a) Basic Rule for Inclusion of Income and Computation of Amount. - Income shall
result from a cancellation of qualifying indebtedness of the taxpayer whenever and to the
extent that the face amount of the indebtedness exceeds the amount of the consideration
for the cancellation, subject to the following qualifications:
(1) Insolvency Situations. - Income shall not result in the insolvency situations described in section X120.
(2) Optional Exclusion. - Income resulting from a cancellation of qualifying indebtedness shall be subject to the optional exclusion provided in section X121.
(b) Ascertainment of Consideration for a Cancellation of Indebtedness. - Only the following items shall be included in the computation of the amount of the consideration for the
cancellation:
(1) Money, Obligations and Services. - The amount of any money or instruments
evidencing indebtedness of the taxpayer and the value of any services rendered, paid, or
promised by the taxpayer, either:
(A) to the creditor as payment, or
(B) to a third party as consideration for the assumption of the qualifying indebtedness.
(2) Property.- Any property (other than the items described in paragraph (I)) disposed of by the taxpayer in connection with the cancellation. In applying this rule, the
treatment of the property as an item of consideration for the cancellation shall be coordinated with the treatment of the indebtedness as an item of amount realized in the
computation of gain or loss resulting from the disposition of the property. The amount of

consideration (as respects the property) for the cancellation shall therefore be the same
as the amount which is determined under section X203(b)

(for the purpose of com-

puting gain or loss in respect of the property) to be realized by the taxpayer on account
of any discharge or assumption of the qualifying indebtedness. This amount, under
section X203(b) is:
(A) The face amount of the qualifying indebtedness; or
(B) The value of the property, where the value is less than the face amount of the
qualifying indebtedness and, as prescribed in section X203(b)(1), the transaction involving the disposition of the property results in the discharge of the qualifying in-
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debtedness. In this situation, the computation of the amount of income resulting from
the cancellation shall be qualified by any loss offset prescribed by section XI18.
Cross Reference to Defined Terms Not Contained in Section X12
Assumption: section X115(f)(4)
SECTION X117. CAPITAL GAIN TREATMENT IN CERTAIN CASES OF CANCELLATION
OF INDEBTEDNESS.
Income from a cancellation of qualifying indebtedness resulting to a taxpayer under
section Xl16 shall be treated as capital gain if any of the following circumstances are
present:
(a) Capital Asset Acquired. -- The indebtedness was incurred or assumed on the acquisition of a capital asset.
(b) Capital Asset Used as Security for Indebtedness. - The indebtedness was incurred or
assumed for money (1) which is used to acquire a capital asset which becomes security for the indebtedness; or
(2) where the full amount of the indebtedness is secured at its inception by a capital
asset owned by the taxpayer, and this asset or another capital asset continues as security
for the indebtedness up to the time of cancellation.
(c) Exchanges and Substitutions of Indebtedness. - The indebtedness was incurred or
assumed in exchange or substitution for an indebtedness of the type described in subsections
(a) or (b) above.
Cross Reference to Defined Terms Not Contained in Sextion X12
Assumption: section X115(f)(4)
Capital Asset: section X226(a)
Capital Gain: section X225(a)
SECTION X118. SPECIAL Loss OFFSET WHERE PROPERTY Is

CONVEYED

IN

CONNECTION WITH TIlE

CANCELLATION OF. INDEBTEDNESS

Where under section Xl16(b)(2) an item of consideration for the cancellation of a qualifying indebtedness is the value of property. and the amount of the indebtedness and the basis
of the property both exceed the value of the property so that income from a cancellation and
a loss in respect of the property both exist, then the following rules shall be applicable in
order properly to reflect the loss:
(a) Offset of Loss. - Before the income resulting from the cancellation is determined, the
difference between the total consideration for the cancellation and the face amount of the
indebtedness shall first be offset by any loss in respect of the property sustained by the taxpayer, in the same taxable year, on the transaction in which the indebtedness is cancelled.
This offset shall be made whether or not a deduction for the loss would otherwise be allowed
to the taxpayer. Only the balance of the difference between the consideration for the cancellation and the face amount of the indebtedness remaining after this offset shall be treated
as income resulting from the cancellation and subject to exclusion under sections X120 and
X121.
(b) Capital Gain or Loss Qualifications.- If the loss is a capital loss (or would be a
capital loss if it were allowed), the loss shall serve as an offset only to the extent that it
is taken into account by the taxpayer under section X231 (or would be so taken into account
if the loss were allowed). Where the income resulting from the cancellation is to be treated
as a capital gain under section X117, the percentage limitation of section X231 on the amount
of a capital gain taken into account shall be applied to the difference between the consideration for the cancellation and the face amount of the indebtedness before the offset is
made.
(c) Treatment of Balance of Loss.- If the loss which serves as an offset is allowable as a
deduction under sections X150 or X160, only the balance of the recognized loss remaining
after the offset shall enter into the other computations under this Chapter.
Cross References to Defined Terms Not Contained in Section X12
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Basis: section X275
Capital Gain: section X225(a)
Capital Loss: section X225(a)
SECTION

X119.

TREATMENT OF

DISCOUNT

AND PREMIUM.

(a) Discount.-If the qualifying indebtedness was incurred by the issuance of obligations for which the amortization of discount was allowed, the amount of the discount remaining unamortized and not yet deducted at the time of the cancellation shall be treated
as an interest expense for the taxable year.
(b) Premium. - If the qualifying indebtedness was incurred by the issuance of obligations
for which the amortization of premium was allowed, the amount of the premium remaining
unamortized at the time of the cancellation shall be included in income for the taxable year.
SECTION

X120.

EXCLUSION IN INSOLVENCY SITUATIONS.

An amount which would otherwise be income from a cancellation of qualifying indebtedness resulting to a taxpayer under section X116 shall not be included in gross income to the
extent that the cancellation is effected under either of the following circumstances:
(a) Cancellation Ordered by Court. -The cancellation is pursuant to an order of any
Federal or State court or other governmental agency in a bankruptcy, reorganization, insolvency, or similar proceeding.
(b) Other Creditor Arrangements. - The cancellation is pursuant to any good faith
creditor arrangement, if(1) it is made at arm's length with substantially all in number of the taxpayer's
creditors of each class affected by the arrangement;
(2) the claims of such creditors represent substantially all in amount of each such
class of the taxpayer's indebtedness; and
(3) the taxpayer's financial condition at the time of the arrangement would have
permitted resort to proceedings of the type described in subsection (a).
SECTION

X121.

OPTIONAL EXCLUSION OF INDEBTEDNESS FROM CANCELLATION OF

INDEBTEDNESS AND QUALIFYING

BAsIs

ADJUSTMENT.

(a) Exclusion in General. -An amount which would otherwise be income from a cancellation of qualifying indebtedness resulting to a taxpayer under section Xl16 may be
excluded from gross income if the taxpayer consents to the reduction of the basis of any
property held during any portion of the taxable year in which the cancellation occurred.
The total reduction in basis shall be equal to the amount excluded from gross income, with
the following qualifications:
(1) The exclusion shall be made even though the taxpayer does not hold any property
to which the reduction in basis may be applied or holds insufficient property. In the
latter event, the reduction shall be to the extent basis is available for reduction.
(2) If section X117 is applicable so that capital gain treatment would extend to the
amount excluded and if the reduction is applied to a capital asset, then the percentage
limitation of section X231(b) shall not apply in computing the amount of gross income
resulting from the cancellation.
(3) If any unamortized discount is present, then the amount excluded from gross
income shall be reduced by the unamortized discount. This discount as a result shall
not be treated as an interest expense under section X119.
(4) If any unamortized premium is present, then the amount excluded from gross
income shall be increased by the unamortized premium. This premium as a result shall
not be included in income under section X119.
(b) Regulations Regarding Manner of Consent and Reduction of Basis. - Regulations
shall prescribe the time and manner of making the consent, the manner of determining the
amount of the reduction, the particular properties to which the reduction shall be allocated,
and the amount of any unamortized discount or premium. These Regulations shall require
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that the reduction be allocated first to any specific property retained by the taxpayer, except
inventory or notes or accounts receivable, for the acquisition of which the cancelled indebtedness was incurred or assumed; second to other specific property retained by the taxpayer, except inventory or notes or accounts receivable, which secured the cancelled indebtedness; and thereafter to other property as prescribed in the Regulations.
APPENDIX B
SEC. 76 Discharge of Indebtedness
(a) In general. - Gross income results, to the extent provided by this chapter, from the discharge, in whole or in part, within the taxable year, of any indebtedness for which the
taxpayer is liable, or subject to which the taxpayer holds property, unless (1) such discharge is effected by virtue of a payment in money;
(2) such discharge is effected in a transaction having the character of a gift to the taxpayer;
(3) such discharge is effected in a transaction having the character of a contribution to
the capital of the taxpayer, whether or not the taxpayer is a corporation, and
whether or not the creditor has any proprietary interest in the taxpayer;
(4) such discharge is effected as an adjustment of the purchase price of property acquired
in connection with the assumption of the indebtedness discharged, provided such discharge is effected within 12 months after the acquisition;
(5) such discharge is effected in any other transaction in which the discharge is attributable to the existence between the parties of a relationship other than that of
debtor-creditor; or
(6) such discharge is within the provisions of section 108, relating to income from discharge of indebtedness.
(b) Certain Items Previously Deducted. - Notwithstanding paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (5)
of subsection (a), and notwithstanding any other provision of law, but subject to the exclusion
provided by section III (relating to recovery of bad debts, etc.), there shall be included in
gross income an amount equal to the excess of (1) the amount of the indebtedness discharged, over
(2) the amount of any money paid plus the adjusted basis for determining gain or loss
to the taxpayer in connection with such discharge, if, on account of such indebtedness,
a deduction for income tax purposes was allowed in a prior taxable year. This subsection shall not apply if, by reason of the method of accounting of the creditor, the
amount for which such deduction was allowed in the prior taxable year was includible in the gross income of the creditor.
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